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Abstract
This dissertation is composed of three chapters. Chapter 1 documents a diver-
gence in the evolution of the labor share between services and non-services in-
dustries in the United States since 1980. Over this period, the labor share for
services industries increased by an average of 6 percentage points, whereas for
the rest of industries it decreased by an average of 14 percentage points. By ex-
ploiting industry-level data, I find that the divergence is occurring in the large
majority of sub-industries, and is correlated with changes in labor intensity across
sub-industries. In order to understand the underlying mechanisms behind this
divergence, I build a quantitative two-sector model and show that the decline in
the aggregate labor share and the divergence across industries are both consistent
with the observed declining trend in the relative price of investment goods. Criti-
cally, differences in the substitutability between capital and labor, and differences
in technical change across industries can account for the divergence.
Chapter 2 (with Sergio Salgado) documents that part of the increase in top
wealth inequality in the United States since the 1980s relates to the rise of “super-
star firms.” We build a novel owner-firm matched panel dataset using information
from the official records of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Forbes, and
Compustat. Using this data we document that: (i) firms at the upper end of
the market value distribution are disproportionately controlled by individuals at
the top of the wealth distribution, (ii) these individuals invest a large fraction of
their net worth in one or two main firms which we interpret as evidence of lack
of asset diversification, and (iii) the output, employment, and market value shares
accounted for by these firms has increased substantially over the last 30 years.
Chapter 3 (with Simone Civale and Fatih Fazilet) develops and tests a discretiza-
tion method to calibrate a Markov chain that features non-zero skewness and high
kurtosis.
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Chapter 1
The Labor Share in the Service
Economy
1
21.1 Introduction
There has been a global decline over recent decades in the aggregate share of income
that goes to labor. For example, in the United States the labor share was mostly stable
at around 66% prior to the 1980s, then started a steady downward trend that has lasted
for the past 35 years. As a result, the labor share had decreased to 60% by 2015. Yet,
I document that this change is not pervasive across industries. In fact, there has been
a general divergence between services and non-services industries in the United States
over the last three decades. From 1980 to 2015, the labor share for services industries
increased by an average of 6 percentage points, whereas for the rest of the industries it
decreased by an average of 14 percentage points.1 A similar diverging pattern is present
in several European countries.2
Previous studies that document the aggregate fall in the labor share in the United
States and other countries include Blanchard (1997), Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013),
Piketty (2014), and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014). Much of this research empha-
sizes the aggregate declining trend. This paper, however, explores the heterogeneity in
the trend of the labor share across industries. By doing so, it delves deeper into the
mechanisms behind the evolution of the labor share not evident using aggregate data
alone.
This paper makes two primary contributions. First, I document the diverging trends
mentioned above using disaggregated industry-level data for the United States and Eu-
rope. In particular, I decompose the changes in industry’s labor share between changes
in the labor share across sub-industries and changes in the overall composition of the
industry. Second, I propose a quantitative two-sector model to explain the industry
trends of the labor share. This model shows that the sharp decline in the relative price
of investment goods can account for both the aggregate decline in the labor share and
the divergence across sectors.
I exploit U.S. aggregate industry-level data from the National Income and Product
Accounts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics to document the changes in the labor
share across industries. I find that, consistent with the aggregate decline, the labor
1Services industries include information, professional and business services, education, health, arts
and entertainment, accomodation, and food services. These industries accounted for about 40% of gross
value added in the United States in 2015. This classification of industries is similar to the one used by
Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and van Reenen (2017b).
2For instance, as documented in Section 1.3, this divergence has also occurred in four of the largest
economies in the European Union: Germany, France, Spain, and Italy.
3share has fallen in most non-services sub-industries. In services industries, however, I
document the opposite pattern: The labor share has increased in the large majority
of sub-industries, and this accounts for more than two-thirds of the sector’s average
increase. The rest is explained by compositional changes that shifted economic activity
toward sub-industries with relatively higher labor share.
I also document a change in labor intensity inside industries that is related to the
sectoral divergence. Within services, sub-industries that were relatively more labor
intensive (i.e., had a higher initial labor share in the 1980s) tended to become even more
labor intensive. Within non-services, the reverse phenomenon occurred: Sub-industries
that were relatively more labor intensive tended to become more capital intensive.
The contrasting pattern between industries calls for an explanation of the aggregate
decline in the labor share that is consistent with the divergence between services and
non-services industries. To provide this explanation I propose a quantitative two-sector
model that builds on Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long,
and Poschke (2015).
The model has two productive sectors, namely services and non-services, whose goods
are consumed by a representative consumer. Non-services goods can be used both for
consumption and investment, whereas services goods are only used for consumption.
Firms in each sector behave competitively and use capital and labor for production
using a sector specific constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology.
The model has three key ingredients. (i) Differences in capital and labor substitutabil-
ity in production across the two sectors. (ii) Differences in the degree of technical change
across the two sectors. (iii) Investment-specific technological change. The first ingredi-
ent allows for differential responses across sectors to shocks in the economy.3 The second
ingredient highlights the potential role of changes in the production technology of each
sector in explaining the divergence. The third ingredient is critical to induce changes
in the relative price of investment and capital goods, which affects the tradeoff between
factors for both sectors.4
3In the model, the labor shares respond to shocks that affect the rental rate of capital, capital-
augmenting technology, and the relative price of services to non-services goods. Importantly, the mag-
nitude and direction of the response also depends on the elasticity of substitution between capital and
labor and distributional parameters for capital and labor.
4After the seminal contribution of Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) many important macroe-
conomic phenomena has been explained in light of the decline of the relative price of investment goods,
as reflecting investment-specific technological change. Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) study
the impact on growth in the United States. Krusell, Ohanian, Ros-Rull, and Violante (2000) argue
that this has caused an increase in wage inequality, whereas Civale (2017) shows that it has caused an
4Using changes in investment-specific technology the model matches the sharp decline
in the relative price of investment goods observed in the United States over the last
three decades. This is the same mechanism used in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014)
to argue that, as the cost of investment and capital goods declines relative to labor, firms
substitute capital for labor. Consequently, the aggregate labor share falls. They find
that this mechanism accounts for half of the observed decrease in the aggregate labor
share.
I calibrate the model to match the observed sectoral labor shares of the United States
in 1980 and conduct two experiments to quantify how much of the divergence can be
accounted for by the first ingredient, differences in the elasticity of substitution across
sectors, and the second ingredient, differences in technical change across sectors. The
third ingredient, investment-specific technological change, directly affects the accumula-
tion of capital. Its effect on the labor share is shaped by differences in the elasticity of
substitution between factors and sector specific technical change. In both experiments,
investment specific technology changes to match the observed decline in the relative
price of investment goods.
When I consider differences in the degree of substitutability between capital and labor
across sectors, I find that the decline in the relative price of investment goods can account
for half of the decrease in the labor share in non-services industries, and most of the
increase in the labor share within services industries, observed over the last 35 years in
the United States. In the model, the decrease in the relative price of capital increases the
demand for non-service goods and the aggregate demand for labor, thus increasing the
wages. In this experiment I allow for capital and labor to behave as complements in the
services sector and as substitutes in the non-services sector. As a consequence, the ratio
of capital to labor is more responsive in the non-services sector, leading to a decline in
the labor share. Since capital and labor are complements in services, and wages increase
in equilibrium, the demand for capital does not rise as much as in non-services. This
reduces the endogenous increase in the capital to labor ratio in the service sector, thus
increasing the labor share.
When I consider differences in technical change across sectors—and capital and labor
are complements in production—the model can explain three-quarters of the decrease in
non-services industries, and half of the increase in services industries. In this experiment
I take the changes in sector/input specific technology from Herrendorf, Herrington, and
increase in wealth inequality.
5Valentinyi (2013). In this case, the divergence is mostly explained by differences in
capital-augmenting technology across sectors that induce a higher increase in capital-to-
labor ratio in the non-services sector relative to the services sector. In equilibrium, as
the rental rate of capital decreases and the wage rate increases, the labor share in the
non-services sector decreases and the labor share in the services sector increases.
Related Literature
This paper is related to several streams of literature. The first stream documents a
decline in the share of GDP going to labor in many nations over recent decades. Since
the seminal contributions of Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013) and Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014), much research has studied the fall in the labor share in the United States
and overseas.5 Although there is no general consensus regarding the magnitude and
starting point of the fall, most agree that the fall is real and significant.6 Closest to this
paper are probably Jones (2003) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013), who emphasize
the heterogeneity of industry’s labor shares over time. I expand on this work, and
highlight the differences between services and non-services industries to demonstrate
that the decline in the labor share is not pervasive across all industries, and that an
important subset has actually experienced an increase over recent decades.
This paper also contributes to recent literature that investigates the causes of the
decline in the labor share over the last 35 years. Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013)
argue that trade and international outsourcing are the most important drivers, and
present evidence that the sectors that were most exposed to foreign competition had
the biggest declines in the labor share (e.g., trade and manufacturing sectors exposed
to higher import competition from China). Two recent papers by Autor, Dorn, Katz,
Patterson, and van Reenen (2017a,b) using U.S. Economic Census microdata put forward
the argument that increasing industry concentration explains the fall in the labor share.
Their explanation relies on the rise of “superstar” firms with low labor shares that are
increasingly gaining market value. A similar conclusion is reached by Barkai (2016),
5See, for example, Dao, Das, Koczan, and Lian (2017) for more recent evidence of the global decline
in the labor share, or Abdih and Danninger (2017) for evidence in the United States. Earlier work
includes Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Harrison (2005), Rodriguez
and Jayadev (2013), and Estrada and Valdeolivas (2014).
6Some measurement concerns raised in the literature include the treatment of self-employment and
proprietors’ income, as discussed in Gollin (2002) and Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013); capital depre-
ciation, as explained in Bridgman (2014); housing, as argued in Rognlie (2015); and the treatment of
intangible capital, as discussed in Yu, Santaeullia-Llopis, and Zheng (2015).
6based on more aggregate data for the United States; by Kehrig and Vincent (2017),
who only consider the U.S. manufacturing sector; and by Berkowitz, Ma, and Nishioka
(2017), who use firm-level data from China. Finally, Grossman et al. (2017) relate the
decline in the labor share to the slowdown in U.S. and world productivity growth. As
explained above, this paper explores the mechanism proposed by Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014) and highlights differences in substitutability between capital and labor
and differences in technical change across industries as potential explanations that are
consistent with both the aggregate fall and sectoral divergence.
This paper also relates to the literature on economic growth and structural transfor-
mation that emphasizes differences in productivity growth and capital intensity across
sectors.7 It is particularly relevant to the work of Zuleta and Young (2013), who develop
a model of induced innovation that can feature different trends in the labor share by
sector. On the more quantitative side, important contributions are by Buera and Ka-
boski (2009, 2012a,b) who analyze the “rise of the service economy.” This paper does
not provide an explanation for the rise of services industries, but explores differences
between services and non-services industries that relate to differences in the evolution
of sectoral labor shares.
Finally, this paper is closest to Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long, and Poschke (2015), who in-
vestigate the difference in the evolution of the labor share of manufacturing and services
in the United States and overseas. The authors present a model of structural transfor-
mation in which the degree of capital-labor substitutability and technical change also
differs across sectors. Their analysis uses a different definition of services.8 Other major
differences are that I consider the effect of the decline in the relative price of investment
goods on the divergent evolution of sectoral labor shares, and document several empirical
regularities that are distinct for services and non-services industries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the data used in
the paper, and Section 1.3 studies the evolution of the labor share in the United States
from 1980 to 2015. Section 1.4 documents the main empirical findings, Section 1.5
lays out the benchmark model, and Section 1.6 calibrates the model and presents the
main quantitative results of the paper. Section 1.7 tests the robustness of the results to
departures from the baseline calibration, and Section 1.8 concludes.
7See, for example, Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) or Ngai and Pissarides (2007).
8They split the economy into agriculture, manufacturing, and services. As a consequence, they find
that the labor share in both manufacturing and services has declined over time and the main difference
between the two sectors is the magnitude of the decline, which is much larger in manufacturing.
71.2 Data
This section describes the data sources used in this paper and their main features. The
first part of the section discusses industry-level data used for the United States, while the
second part of the section discusses the data used for Europe. The last part of the section
reviews the U.S. data on the decline in the relative price of investment goods. Further
details on the datasets and construction of the variables are contained in Section A.2.
NIPA and BLS data
The cross-sector analysis of this paper relies on the U.S. Gross Domestic Product by
Industry Data of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) published by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For each industry, NIPA reports annual data on
value added, wages and salaries, total compensation of employees9, taxes, and full-time
and part-time employees at the industry level from 1980 to 2015. Value added and
full- and part-time employee data are available from 1980 to 2015 on the basis of the
North America Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. However, data on wages
and salaries, total compensation, and taxes are only available on the basis of NAICS
codes from 1998 and 1987. Previous data for wages and salaries, total compensation,
and taxes are on the basis of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Given this
data limitation, I only use the 10-industry level of detailed data in Section 1.3. This
level of aggregation extends the empirical analysis back to 1980. For Section 1.4, when
I further explore the differences between services and non-services industries, I use the
60-industry level of detailed data since 1987.
This paper complements the NIPA data with more dissaggregated industry-level data
from the Input-Output tables produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The
BLS reports annual data on value added, total compensation of employees, and taxes
for about 200 industries. However, the dataset only spans from 1997 to 2015. I use this
dataset to implement robustness checks for some of the empirical results discussed in
the paper.
9Wages and salaries plus fringe benefits and non-wage compensation.
8KLEMS data
This paper supplements U.S. industry data with the September 2017 release of EU
KLEMS Growth and Productivity accounts.10 The dataset covers all European Union
(EU-28) countries and the United States. Consistent data on value added, total com-
pensation, and taxes are available from 1995 to 2015 for most of the countries. The
raw series is taken from the national accounts of all individual countries, and is consis-
tent with the official statistics available in Eurostat and NIPA. At the lowest level of
aggregation, data were collected for 34 industries. I use this data to document a simi-
lar divergence in labor share between services and non-services industries across several
European countries.
The Relative Price of Investment Goods
NIPA reports the price deflator for several categories of investment. The price for each
of these categories relative to consumption is computed using these deflators. NIPA
controls for quality improvement when calculating quantities and prices of its accounts.
However, Gordon (1990) has argued that NIPA deflators underestimate quality improve-
ment, and therefore the actual fall in the relative price of investment. To correct for
this bias, DiCecio (2009) extrapolates the quality-adjusted price time series of Gordon
to 2010, using the same technique of Cummins and Violante (2002) and Fisher (2006).
I adopt the extrapolated time series of DiCecio as a benchmark. When controlling for
quality improvement, the relative price of investment goods declined by 57% from 1980
to 2015.
1.3 Evolution of the Compensation Share
This section studies the evolution of the labor share contrasting services and non-services
industries. First, I define the notion of compensation share, a proxy for the labor share.
Then, I describe the rise of the services industries and the evolution of the labor share
in the United States since 1980 using industry-level NIPA data. Finally, I show that the
same empirical patterns are also present in some major European countries.
10See Ja¨ger (2017) for further details. Data are available at http://www.euklems.net.
9Definition of the Compensation Share
To render the analysis as comparable as possible with previous research, this paper
focuses on the nonfarm U.S. business sector.11 Nominal value added by industry equals
the sum of nominal gross value added plus taxes on production and imports net of
subsidies. The industry labor share is defined as the share of sectoral GDP minus
taxes that go to labor. Labor income includes all payments to workers and returns
from labor earned by self-employed workers. Data on the latter are not available by
industry in NIPA. Therefore, I focus on the industry compensation share, defined as,
total compensation over gross value added and denoted by:12
Si =
wiLi
PiYi
where wiLi is total labor compensation for workers on employers’ payroll and PiYi is
nominal gross value added (nominal value added net of taxes) of industry i. Total com-
pensation includes wages and salaries, fringe benefits, and other non wage compensation.
The aggregate compensation share can then be expressed as the sum of the compensation
shares by industry weighted by nominal gross value added:
S =
∑
iwiLi∑
i PiYi
=
∑
iwiLi
PY
=
∑
i
PiYi
PY
wiLi
PiYi
=
∑
i
ωiSi
where ωi =
PiYi
PY is the gross value added share of industry i, and Si =
wiLi
PiYi
is its
compensation share. The aggregate compensation share, S, is therefore a combination
of the industries’ weight on the economy, ωi, and the industries’ compensation shares,
Si. The next section documents the evolution of the gross value added share, ωi, and of
the compensation share, Si, since 1980.
11The nonfarm business sector excludes general government, private households, nonprofit organiza-
tions serving individuals, and farms. BEA data do not distinguish between nonprofit institutions serving
households and businesses, and private households are included in the sub-industry “other services.” The
analysis, therefore, includes these two but excludes both the government sector and “farms.”
12Figure A.7 in Section A.2.2 plots the dynamics of the compensation and labor share for the U.S.
from 1987 to 2015 using KLEMS data, and shows that the dynamics of the compensation share track
closely with the dynamics of the labor share. This supports the use of the compensation share as a proxy
to study the evolution of the labor share across industries.
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Figure 1.1: Gross Value Added and Employment Share, 1980-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the evolution of gross value added and employment shares for services industries
(red circles line) and non-services industries (dashed blue line) from 1980 to 2015 using industry-level
NIPA data. Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 plot the evolution of gross value added and employment shares
for a more disaggregated set of industries.
The Rise of the Service Economy
The left panel in Figure 1.1 plots the change in the gross value added share, ωi, for
services and non-services industries between 1980 and 2015. It illustrates the well-
documented transition of the U.S. economy from a manufacturing and trade/transportation
economy to a service economy: Services was one of only two major industries (with fi-
nance and real estate) that experienced an increase in its relative share over these years.
As a result of this shift in economic activity, services industries’ gross value added share
went from 26% in 1980 to about 38% of the total U.S. nonfarm business sector by 2015.
The transition to a services economy is even more evident when looking at the evolu-
tion of employment shares by industry. As the right panel in Figure 1.1 shows, services
went through a huge increase in the employment share over the sample period: The
employment share for services increased from 35% in 1980 to around 55% in 2015.
This section demonstrates that services industries represents a large part of the U.S.
economy, and have become even more important over time. I will now discuss how the
aggregate—and, more importantly, how the sectoral compensation shares for services
and non-services—have evolved since 1980.
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Figure 1.2: Compensation Share in the United States, 1980-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage points change in the aggregate (black line), services (red circles),
and non-services (dashed blue line) compensation shares from 1980 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA
data. All series are normalized to zero in 1980. Figure A.3 plots the evolution of the levels.
Compensation Share in the Service Economy
As discussed by Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013), the evolution of the aggregate com-
pensation share in the United States can be divided into three distinct periods during
the postwar period. First, between 1950 and the early 1980s, the aggregate compensa-
tion share was remarkably constant without an obvious trend. Then, a declining trend
started in the early 1980s. Finally, this decline accelerated from the year 2000. As a
result, from the early 1980s to 2015, the aggregate compensation share decreased by
about 6 percentage points. The solid black line in Figure 1.2 plots this declining trend
starting in the year 1980.13
This aggregate measure, however, hides two distinct patterns that have not been
emphasized enough in previous work. Figure 1.2 also plots the average evolution of the
compensation share for services (red circles line) and non-services (dashed blue line)
industries since 1980. The differences between the two are stark: The non-services
industries compensation share decreased, on average, by 14 percentage points, whereas
services industries’ compensation share increased by 6 percentage points. This is in clear
contrast to the historical evolution of industry compensation shares before 1980, when
all seemed to move together.
13Section A.3 discusses the historical evolution of the compensation share since 1950.
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Figure 1.3: Compensation Share for the Largest Economies in the Euro-
pean Union, 1995-2015
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Notes: This figure shows the aggregate (black line), services (red circles) and non-services (dashed blue
line) compensation shares for the four largest economies in the Europe Union. All series are normalized
to zero in 1995.
Figure 1.3 shows that the divergence in the evolution of the compensation share has
also occurred in four of the largest economies in the European Union. It plots the
aggregate compensation share and sectoral compensation shares for Germany, France,
Spain, and Italy.14 All four countries exhibit a downward-sloping trend for non-services
industries and a upward-sloping trend for services industries. In fact, as shown in Sec-
tion A.2.2, most of the countries in the European Union experienced a similar divergence
over recent decades: Nineteen countries experienced a divergence in the compensation
share, compared with eight that experienced a convergence. Consistent with the evi-
dence for the United States, this divergence was predominantly the result of a decrease in
the compensation share in non-services industries and an increase in services industries.
Why have services industries experienced a steady increase in the compensation share
14In 1995, the compensation share in services is larger in all European countries, with the exception
of Germany. In Germany, the compensation share is 56.55% in services and 57.25% in non-services.
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at the same time that non-services industries have undergone a large fall? What drives
this diverging pattern? One possibility is that services industries have become more labor
intensive and non-services industries less labor intensive. Alternatively, the composition
of industries within these two sets of industries could have shifted. Changes in trade
barriers, the cost of capital, or the cost of outsourcing, for example, could have changed
the aggregate labor intensity within services and non-services industries by shifting the
industry’s composition. The next section explores the differences between non-services
and services industries.
1.4 Divergence of the Compensation Share
This section delves deeper into the aggregate declining trend and the divergence of the
compensation share between non-services and services industries. Using more disaggre-
gated data by industry demonstrates that consistent with previous work, the compen-
sation share has fallen in most non-services sub-industries, and is therefore mostly a
within-industry phenomenon. For services industries, the average increase in the share
of income going to labor is mostly a within-industry phenomenon too. However, part of
the increase is also a consequence of economic activity shifting to sub-industries within
services that have a high compensation share.
Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of the compensation share for some selected sub-
industries in services and non-services between 1987 and 2015.15 Two remarks are in
order. First, overall, most services sub-industries tended to become more labor inten-
sive, and most non-services industries tended to become more capital intensive. Second,
within industries, the magnitude of the increase or decrease in the compensation share
was very heterogeneous, especially after the 2000s.
Within services, except for information, all sub-industries experienced an increase
in, or a flat evolution of, the compensation share over the sample period. The largest
increases were in other services, health, and professional services, which rose by 12, 9, and
6 percentage points, respectively. As a whole, services industries experienced an average
increase of 6 percentage points since 1987. This is in clear contrast to the evolution of the
compensation share for non-services industries. With only the exception of finance and
15As explained in Section A.2.1, industry definitions in NIPA changed in 1987 from an SIC basis to
an NAICS basis. Consistent mapping between the two bases at a more disaggregated level, especially
for services sub-industries, is not feasible. The analysis in this section, therefore, starts in 1987, when
consistent data on an NAICS basis become available for all sub-industries.
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Figure 1.4: Sub-Industry Compensation Shares, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the change in the compensation share for some selected sub-industries from 1980
to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. All series are normalized to zero in 1980. Figure A.4 plots the
evolution of the levels.
real estate (FIRE), which showed no trend, all non-services industries experienced a large
fall in compensation share. Traditional non-services industries, such as manufacturing,
transportation, and construction, fell by 18, 10, and 7 percentage points, respectively.
Wholesale and retail trade decreased by 14 and 6 percentange points, respectively. As
a group, non-services industries experienced an average decline of around 10 percentage
points since 1987.16 Figure A.5 in Section A.1 plots the change in the compensation
share between 1987 and 2015 for all sub-industries and shows that within services, 15
sub-industries had an increase compared to 4 that experienced a decrease. For non-
services, only 6 out of 41 had an increase in their compensation share.17
16This includes agriculture (except for farms), mining, and utilities, which are not plotted in Figure 1.4.
17Table A.1 in Section A.1 reports the levels of and differences in the compensation share, gross
value added share, and employment share for each services sub-industry and some selected non-services
sub-industries from 1987 to 2015.
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Finally, from 2000 on, the heterogeneity has been exacerbated. Especially in non-
services industries, a big change occurred in trends for traditional sectors, such as man-
ufacturing, transportation, and construction. This large decline in the compensation
share within non-services industries accounts for most of the accelerated decline in the
aggregate compensation share since the 2000s.
How has the composition of sub-industries changed within services and non-services
industries? Figure 1.5 plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in the
gross value added share between 1987 and 2015 for 60 sub-industries within services and
non-services. I estimate OLS regressions separately for each set of sub-industries of the
form:
∆ωi,t = β0 + β1Si,t + i,t (1.1)
where ωi,t is the gross value added share of sub-industry i at time t and Si,t is the
compensation share of sub-industry i at time t. The coefficients that result from the
estimation of equation Equation 1.1 are also plotted for each sector.
Figure 1.5 shows that services sub-industries that were more labor intensive tended
to expand relative to capital-intensive industries. For example, a 10 percentage points
higher compensation share in 1987 is associated with a 0.22 percentage points higher
increase in the gross value added share between 1987 and 2015. Thus shifts in compo-
sition have also played a role in the increase of the compensation share within services
sub-industries. However, no pattern is observed within non-services industries. This
is consistent with the idea that the fall in the compensation share within non-services
industries is mainly a within-industry phenomenon.
As has been argued before, 2000 was a turning point: The compensation share started
falling faster, and the divergence between non-services and services industries widened.
To explore whether the effect was different from 2000 on, I estimate Equation 1.1 from
1987 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2015. The results are reported in Figure 1.6. Consistent
with the idea that the dynamics of the compensation share further changed around the
2000s, Figure 1.6 shows that most of the compositional effect within services industries
is explained by changes during the 2000-2015 period.
I now more formally address the question of how much of the change in the com-
pensation share in each industry is accounted for by compositional changes across sub-
industries or changes in the compensation share within those sub-industries. I implement
16
Figure 1.5: Change in Gross Value Added Share, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in gross value added share
from 1987 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Each blue circle (services) and black square (non-
services) represents a NIPA sub-industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s gross value added
share in 1987. The dotted red line shows the best-fit line, using the 1987 gross value added share as
the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slopes is statistically different at a 10% level of
significance.
Figure 1.6: Decomposition of the Change in Gross Value Added Share,
1987-2015
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Notes: The left figure plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in gross value added
share from 1987 to 2000. The right figure plots the compensation share in 2000 against the change in
gross value added share from 2000 to 2015. Each black square (non-services) and blue circle (services)
represents a NIPA sub-industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s gross value added share in
1987. The dotted red line shows the best-fit line, using the 1987 gross value added share as the sub-
industry weight. The difference between the slopes is statistically different at a 1% level of significance
for 2000-2015. Figure A.11 plots these correlations using more dissaggregated industry-level BLS data.
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a “shift-share” analysis of the change in the compensation share within non-services and
services industries separately between 1987 and 2015. This analysis confirms the results
discussed in this section.
Note that it is possible to decompose the changes in the compensation share over time
into two components for each set of sub-industries separately:
∆SI =
∑
i∈I
ωi∆Si︸ ︷︷ ︸
“shift”
+
∑
i∈I
∆ωiSi︸ ︷︷ ︸
“share”
(1.2)
where I = S for services and I = NS for non-services industries.
The “shift” component measures within-sub-industry contributions to the change in
the industry’s compensation share. This is the weighted average of the changes in
the sub-industry’s compensation share. The “share” component measures the between-
sub-industry contributions to the change in the industry’s compensation share. If this
component is positive, more labor-intensive sub-industries have grown relative to less
labor-intensive sub-industries. I look at the changes, from 1987 on, for the industry’s
compensation share, ∆SI; the within-sub-industry component, ∆Si; and the between-
sub-industry component, ∆ωi.
Figure 1.7 shows the decomposition of the industry’s compensation shares, as in Equa-
tion 1.2. Black lines plot the evolution of the compensation share for non-services and
services industries between 1987 and 2015. Over these years, the compensation share
for non-services industries declined by about 10 percentage points. For services, it in-
creased by about 6 percentage points. This decomposition points to the importance of
the within-sub-industry component in the divergent evolution of compensation shares.
For non-services, it accounts for almost all of the decline, and for services it accounts
for more than two-thirds of the increase. The rest is accounted for by the between-sub-
industry component, which accounts for around 2.5 percentage points of the increase in
the compensation share, of which 1.5 percentage points occurred since the 2000s.
Consistent with previous evidence, this decomposition points to the importance of
both differences in the evolution of the compensation share within sub-industries and
compositional changes for understanding the distinct evolution of the compensation
share for services industries. Nevertheless, it remains true that most of the effect is
within sub-industries.
18
Figure 1.7: Decomposition of the Industry’s Compensation Share
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Notes: This figure plots the decomposition of the compensation share for non-services (left panel) and
services (right panel) industries from 1987 to 2015. The black solid line is the average compensation
share within each industry. The red circles line is the shift component and the dashed blue line is the
share component as defined in the text.
Finally, I explore how changes within sub-industries are related to changes across sub-
industries. Figure 1.8 plots each sub-industry’s change in gross value added against the
change in compensation share between 1987 and 2015 separately for non-services and
services industries. This figure contains a great deal of information, and summarizes
well the main conclusions of this section.
First, Figure 1.8 shows that most sub-industries in non-services have shrunk, whereas
most sub-industries in services have expanded. Most non-services sub-industries (black
squares) are below zero, while most services sub-industries (blue circles) are above zero.
This is consistent with the steady transformation of the U.S. economy into a service
economy.
Second, it shows that the majority of sub-industries in non-services have experienced
a decrease in their compensation share, whereas the majority of sub-industries in ser-
vices have experienced an increase in their compensation share. Most non-services sub-
industries (black squares) are to the left of zero, while most services sub-industries (blue
circles) are to the right of zero. This is both consistent with the divergent path of the
aggregate compensation share between these two sets of industries and in line with the
conclusion of the shift-share analysis that most of the action in compensation shares is
occurring within sub-industries.
Lastly, the correlation between the change in the gross value added share and the
change in the compensation share shows that sub-industries that grew more were those
19
Figure 1.8: Change in Gross Value Added Share and Compensation Share,
1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the change in gross value added share against the change in compensation share
from 1987 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Each black square (non-services) and blue circle
(services) represents a NIPA sub-industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s gross value added
share in 1987. The dotted red line shows the best-fit line, using the 1987 gross value added share as
the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slopes is statistically different at a 10% level of
significance. Figure A.12 plots these correlations using more disaggregated industry-level BLS data.
with the largest increase in the compensation share within services and those with the
largest decline in the compensation share within non-services.18
To further understand the differences between non-services and services industries,
the next section examines the changes in labor intensity within industries.
Changes in labor intensity
Figure 1.9 plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in the compensation
share between 1987 and 2015 for 60 sub-industries within services and non-services
industries. I estimate OLS regressions separately for each set of sub-industries of the
form:
∆Si,t = β0 + β1Si,t + i,t (1.3)
where Si,t is the compensation share of sub-industry i at time t. The coefficients that
result from the estimation of Equation 1.3 are also plotted.
18Oberfield and Raval (2014) also find a negative correlation when only looking at manufacturing
industries.
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It is clear that they have the exact opposite pattern. Within non-services, sub-
industries that had a high compensation share in 1987 experienced a larger decrease
in the compensation share between 1987 and 2015. For example, a 10 percentage points
higher compensation share in 1987 is associated with a 2.3 percentage points higher
decrease in the compensation share between 1987 and 2015. However, within services,
sub-industries that had a high compensation share in 1987 experienced a larger increase
in the compensation share. For example, a 10 percentage points higher compensation
share in 1987 is associated with a 1.5 percentage points higher increase in the compensa-
tion share between 1987 and 2015. This pattern is especially surprising in services, given
that the initial values were already high and compensation shares cannot be higher than
100%.
As we have shown before, 2000 was a turning point: The compensation share started
falling faster, and the divergence between non-services and services industries widened.
To explore whether the effect was different from 2000 on, I separately estimate Equa-
tion 1.3 from 1987 to 2000 and from 2000 to 2015. The results are reported in Figure 1.10.
Consistent with the idea that the dynamics of the compensation share changed around
the 2000s, Figure 1.10 shows that most of the effect between 1987 and 2015 is explained
by changes in labor intensity during the 2000-2015 period.
All of these patterns are striking, and call for an explanation that can reconcile the
different evolution of the compensation share in services and non-services industries.
The key insight from this section is that the divergent pattern is mainly a within-sub-
industry phenomenon. The next section lays out a two-sector model that is consistent
with the general divergence between industries and the aggregate fall in the labor share.
1.5 Model
This section develops a model for studying the impact of the declining relative price of in-
vestment on the divergence in the compensation share between non-services and services
industries. It builds on Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) and Alvarez-Cuadrado, Long,
and Poschke (2015). After presenting the model, this section describes the competitive
equilibrium of the model. The last part of the section derives the exact expression for
the compensation share in non-services and services industries.
I consider a representative agent model in which both non-services and services final
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Figure 1.9: Change in the Compensation Share, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in the compensation share
from 1987 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Each black square (non-services) and blue circle
(services) represents a NIPA sub-industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s gross value added
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the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slopes is statistically different at a 5% level of
significance.
Figure 1.10: Decomposition of the Change in the Compensation Share,
1987-2015
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Notes: The left figure plots the compensation share in 1987 against the change in the compensation
share from 1987 to 2000. The right figure plots the compensation share in 2000 against the change
in the compensation share between 2000 and 2015. Each black square (non-services) and blue circle
(services) represents a NIPA sub-industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s gross value added
share in 1987. The dotted red line shows the best-fit line, using the 1987 gross value added share as sub-
industry weight. The difference between the slopes is statistically different at a 5% level of significance
for the period 2000-2015. Figure A.13 plots these correlations using more disaggregated industry-level
BLS data.
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goods are produced. Time is discrete. There is no uncertainty, and all economic agents
have perfect foresight. There are three sectors in the economy. (i) A non-services goods
producer competitively aggregates capital and labor to produce non-services goods. (ii)
A services goods producer competitively aggregates capital and labor to produce services
goods. (iii) Investment goods are produced competitively using the non-service goods
as an input.
In what follows, the description of the model starts with the problem of the three
sectors and the characterization of their optimal demand for labor and capital. I then
describe the household problem and market clearing conditions. Throughout this section,
the subscript m denotes non-services goods and s denotes services goods.
Non-services Goods Producer
The non-service goods producer uses a CES technology to produce the non-service goods,
Ym,t = F (Km,t, Lm,t) =
(
αm(Bm,tKm,t)
σm−1
σm + (1− αm)(Am,tLm,t)
σm−1
σm
) σm
σm−1
where σm denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production,
αm is a distribution parameter, and Am,t and Bm,t denote labor-augmenting and capital-
augmenting technology, respectively.
The non-service goods producer solves the following problem:
max.
Km,t,Lm,t
Ym,t − wtLm,t −RtKm,t
where wt denotes the wage rate and Rt denotes the rental rate of capital. Competitive
markets and cost minimization imply:
Rt = αmB
σm−1
σm
m,t
(
Ym,t
Km,t
) 1
σm
wt = (1− αm)A
σm−1
σm
m,t
(
Ym,t
Lm,t
) 1
σm
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Services Goods Producer
The services producer uses a CES technology to produce the service goods,
Ys,t = F (Ks,t, Ls,t) =
(
αs(Bs,tKs,t)
σs−1
σs + (1− αs)(As,tLs,t)
σs−1
σs
) σs
σs−1
where σs denotes the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in production,
αs is a distribution parameter, and As,t and Bs,t denote labor-augmenting and capital-
augmenting technology, respectively.
The services producer solves a problem similar to the non-services goods producer
which implies:
Rt = αsB
σs−1
σs
s,t
(
Ys,t
Ks,t
) 1
σs
wt = (1− αs)A
σs−1
σs
s,t
(
Ys,t
Ls,t
) 1
σs
Investment Goods Producer
Let qt denote the price of one unit of the investment goods. The investment goods
producer uses a linear technology that turns one unit of the non-services goods into Ax,t
units of the investment goods Xt. Therefore, it solves:
max.
Y xm,t
Xtqt − Y xm,t
s.t. Xt = Y
x
m,tAx,t
Hence qt = 1/Ax,t. This modeling strategy implies that the relative price of invest-
ment goods is driven entirely by investment-specific production efficiency. In the study of
transitional dynamics, Ax,t changes exogenously. It also implies that capital is only pro-
duced by the non-services goods producer, and therefore services goods are nondurable
and fully consumed at every period. This is the main difference between non-services
and services goods, along with technology and preferences.
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Household Problem
The economy is populated by an infinitely lived representative household. The household
derives utility from non-services and services goods. The household uses the investment
goods, Xt, to augment the capital stock, and rents capital to the non-services goods
producer and the services goods producer at the rental rate Rt. It supplies inelastically
one unit of labor to the non-services and services goods producers at the wage rate wt.
Capital depreciates at rate δ, and the discounted factor is denoted by β. Therefore, the
representative household solves the following problem:
max.
Cs,t, Cm,t,Kt+1, Lt
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Cs,t, Cm,t)
s.t. Cm,t + ps,tCs,t + qtXt ≤ RtKt + wtLt
Xt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt
K0 given
with Kt ≥ 0, Cm,t, Cs,t ≥ 0, and ps,t denoting the prices of services goods in terms of
non-services goods.
Market Clearing
All markets clear —the market for the non-services consumption good and investment
good,
Ym,t = Cm,t + Y
x
m,t
= Cm,t +
Xt
Ax,t
the labor market,
Ls,t + Lm,t = 1
the capital market,
Ks,t +Km,t = Kt
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and the services good market,
Ys,t = Cs,t
Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is:
a) exogenous sequences {Ax,t, Am,t, Bm,t, As,t, Bs,t},
b) a sequence of prices {ps,t, Rt, wt, qt}, and
c) a sequence of quantities {Cm,t, Cs,t,Kt+1,Km,t,Ks,t, Lm,t, Ls,t, Ym,t, Ys,t}
that satisfy the following conditions:
i) given prices, {Cm,t, Cs,t,Kt+1} solve the household problem.
ii) given prices, {Km,t, Lm,t, Ym,t} minimize the cost of the non-services good pro-
ducer.
iii) given prices, {Ks,t, Ls,t, Ys,t} minimize the cost of the services good producer.
iv) given prices, {Y xm,t} minimize the cost of the investment good producer.
v) markets for the non-services and services consumption good, investments good,
labor and capital clear at every date.
A steady-state equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which all variables are con-
stant over time.
The Labor Share
This section derives an expression for the labor share in the non-services and services
sectors. Using the first-order conditions from the producers’ problems, I obtain an ex-
pression that relates the labor share to the rental rate of capital, Rt, capital augmenting
technology, Bi,t, and the price of services, ps,t, given the elasticity of substitution between
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labor and capital, σi, and the distributional parameter, αi:
SL,m,t =
wtLm,t
RtKm,t + wtLm,t
= 1− ασmm
(
Bm,t
Rt
)σm−1
(1.4)
SL,s,t =
wtLs,t
RtKs,t + wtLs,t
= 1− ασss
(
ps,tBs,t
Rt
)σs−1
(1.5)
Notice that if σi equals 1, the CES technology boils down to a Cobb-Douglas technology,
and the labor share in each sector equals 1− αi and its constant over time. Finally, the
aggregate labor share can be written as
SL,t = SL,m,t
(
Ym,t
Ym,t + ps,tYs,t
)
+ SL,s,t
(
ps,tYs,t
Ym,t + ps,tYs,t
)
,
the sum of the sector’s labor share weighted by its value added.
1.6 Quantitative Results
This section calibrates the model and presents the main quantitative results of the paper.
The objective of this quantitative exercise is to study the different impact of the decline
in the relative price of investment on non-services and services industries as a mechanism
to explain the divergence in the labor share between the two sectors, as documented in
Section 1.3. First, I explore differences in the degree of substitutability between capital
and labor in production. After that, I examine differences in technical change across
industries.
To carry this out, the model is calibrated to its steady-state equilibrium so that
it matches the sectoral compensation shares of the U.S. economy in 1980. Then the
declining trend in the relative price of investment—shown in Figure A.14—is fed into
the model. As the economy responds to the decline in the relative price of investment
goods, differences in technology parameters in the non-services and service sector imply
differences in the evolution of the labor share for each industry.
I find that when I allow for differences in the degree of substitutability between factors,
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the model can account for 45% of the decrease in the labor share in non-services industries
and 93% of the increase in services industries observed over the last 35 years in the United
States. When I only consider differences in technical change and capital and labor are
complements in production in both sectors, the model can explain 74% of the decrease
in non-services industries, and half of the increase in services industries.
1.6.1 Calibration
This section shows the calibration of the model. Each period in the model corresponds
to one year. Table 1.1 reports the parameters of the model that are calibrated indepen-
dently, whereas Table 1.2 reports the parameters that are jointly calibrated to match
the moments reported in Table 1.3.
Preferences
The utility function is assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in non-services and services goods:
u(Cs, Cm) = C
γ
mC
1−γ
s
The parameter γ equals 0.37 to match the average consumption share of non-services
goods in the United States from 1980 and 2015, as reported by Boppart (2014). The
discount rate β is calibrated to generate a capital-over-output ratio of 3 in the initial
steady-state equilibrium. The calibrated value for β is 0.93.
Production Technology and Capital Depreciation
Let us assume a capital depreciation rate δ of 0.05. The two sectors have a CES pro-
duction technology that is characterized by two parameters —αi, the distributional
parameter, and σi, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor —and two
exogenous sequences, Ai,t and Bi,t, which represent labor- and capital-augmenting tech-
nology, respectively. To the best of my knowledge, there are no estimates of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and labor, and labor- and capital-augmenting technology
for the exact split of the economy used in this paper. I therefore explore two different
calibrations of the model.
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Table 1.1: Parameters Calibrated Independently
Parameters σm > 1, σs < 1 HHV
Value Value
Capital Depreciation δ 0.05 0.05
Share of Non-Services Goods γ 0.37 0.37
Elasticity of Substitution (Non-Services) σm 1.25 0.8
Elasticity of Substitution (Services) σs 0.75 0.75
This table shows the parameters of the benchmark model that are calibrated independently.
Table 1.2: Parameters Calibrated Jointly in Equilibrium
Parameters σm > 1, σs < 1 HHV
Value Value
Discount Factor β 0.93 0.93
Distributional Parameter (Non-Services) αm 0.34 0.59
Distributional Parameter (Services) αs 0.46 0.50
This table shows the parameters of the benchmark model that are calibrated jointly to match the initial
steady-state equilibrium for the moments reported in Table 1.3.
Table 1.3: Data and Model Moments
Targets Data σm > 1, σs < 1 HHV
Capital to Output Ratio 3 3.00 3.00
Compensation Share (Non-Services) 0.57 0.57 0.57
Compensation Share (Services) 0.66 0.66 0.66
This table summarizes the joint calibration exercise. The data column reports the targets of the calibra-
tion, whereas the model columns report the moments of the calibrated model. The calibrated parameters
that generate the model moments are reported in Table 1.2.
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First, I set σm and σs equal to 1.25 and 0.75, respectively. These values correspond to
the benchmark estimate for the aggregate elasticity of substitution in Karabarbounis and
Neiman (2014), and to the estimate of the elasticity of substitution for services industries
in Herrendorf, Herrington, and Valentinyi (2013).19 The distributional parameters are
calibrated to match the initial value for the compensation share for each industry in
1980. The calibrated values for αm and αs are 0.34 and 0.46, respectively.
However, although the range of estimates is wide, the bulk of the empirical litera-
ture suggests an elasticity below one for most industries. Oberfield and Raval (2014)
and Lawrence (2015) have proposed that with limited substitution possibilities between
capital and labor, the fall in the labor share can be explained by changes in the pace
of technical change. The second experiment considers an alternative calibration of the
benchmark model that uses direct estimates from Herrendorf, Herrington, and Valentinyi
(2013) (HHV).20 They find that σm equals 0.8, and σs equals 0.75. I recalibrate the model
in 1980 to match the sectoral compensation shares and find that αm and αs are 0.59
and 0.50, respectively.
1.6.2 Differences in Substitutability between Capital and Labor
This section shows the main quantitative results for the first calibration of the model. In
1980, it is assumed that the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium. The representative
agent then learns about the future decreasing path of the relative price of investment
goods. In the benchmark exercise, the price of investment declines by 57% from 1980
to 2015, as shown in Figure A.14, and remains constant after that for the rest of the
transition. Figure 1.11 shows the evolution of prices. As investment goods become
cheaper, the wage rate, wt, and the price of services, ps,t, increase, whereas the rental
rate of capital, Rt, decreases.
Table 1.4 shows the change in the aggregate and industry compensation shares be-
tween 1980 and 2015, comparing the output of the model with NIPA data. The model
can account for one-third of the fall in the aggregate compensation share, half of the
decline in the non-services compensation share, and most of the increase in the services
compensation share. Figure 1.12 plots the time series for the compensation shares in
services and non-services, comparing the model transition with data from NIPA industry
19Their definition of services industries includes all sectors apart from agriculture and manufacturing.
20Their split of the economy is between agriculture, manufacturing and services. I assume that non-
services industries correspond to manufacturing.
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Figure 1.11: Prices, 1980-2015 (σm > 1, σs < 1)
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Notes: This figure plots prices over the transition. The time series for the price of investment, qt, is fed
into the model, whereas the wage rate, wt, the rental rate, Rt, and the price of services goods, ps,t, are
the result of general equilibrium.
accounts.
In Equation 1.4 and Equation 1.5, the only non-constant variables that affect the
evolution of the sectoral compensation shares are the price of services, ps,t, and the
rental rate of capital, Rt. As shown in Figure 1.11, prices take some time to respond,
and this explains why sectoral compensation shares are flat during the first 10 years
of the transition. The rental rate of capital then starts falling, and the diverging path
for sectoral compensation shares unfolds. For services, the rise in the relative price of
services goods further increases the labor share in this sector. The different magnitude
of the response across sectors is a consequence of differences in the values for σ and α.
The key parameters that govern the distinct evolution of compensation shares are the
elasticities of substitution between capital and labor, σm and σs. For this calibration,
they are set equal to 1.25 and 0.75, respectively. This implies that capital and labor
are substitutes in production in the non-services sector and complements in the services
sector. In this economy, as the rental rate of capital decreases, both producers increase
their capital-to-labor ratio. However, the increase for the non-services producer is much
steeper. In fact, the differences are large enough to entail a decrease in the compensation
share in non-services and an increase in services.
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Table 1.4: Compensation Share: Change from 1980 to 2015 (σm > 1, σs < 1)
Data σm > 1, σs < 1
Aggregate -5.4 pp -1.51 pp
Non-Services -13.61 pp -6.13 pp
Services 5.63 pp 5.22 pp
Notes: This table compares the data generated by the model with industry-level NIPA data. Results
are displayed in percentage points (pp) differences. The 1980 calibration that generates this output is
reported in Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3. Figure 1.12 plots the time series for these changes.
Figure 1.12: Compensation Share: Data and Model, 1980-2015 (σm > 1, σs < 1)
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Notes: This figure compares the data generated by the model with industry-level NIPA data. The left
panel shows the non-services sector, and the right panel shows the services sector. The 1980 calibration
that generates this output is reported in Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3. Table 1.4 shows a direct
comparison of the change in the compensation shares from 1980 to 2015, and Figure A.19 plots the
aggregate compensation share.
1.6.3 Differences in Technical Change
This section considers an alternative calibration of the benchmark model that uses direct
estimates from Herrendorf, Herrington, and Valentinyi (2013). They find that σm equals
0.8, and σs equals 0.75. They also find differences in capital- and labor-augmenting
technological progress between manufacturing and services. Growth rates for labor-
augmenting technology were 4.4% per year in manufacturing, but only 1.6% for services.
For capital-augmenting technology, growth rates were -4.5% in manufacturing and flat
for services. In this experiment, I therefore assume that all Am, As, Bm, and Bs are
equal to one in 1980, and feed into the model the series for the price of investment goods,
as well as exogenous series for Am,t As,t, and Bm,t. In the benchmark calibration, the
exogenous series for technical change grows at a constant rate from 1980 to 2015, and
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Figure 1.13: Prices, 1980-2015 (HHV)
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Notes: This figure plots prices over the transition. The time series for the price of investment, qt, is fed
into the model, whereas the wage rate, wt, the rental rate, Rt, and the price of services goods, ps,t, are
the result of general equilibrium.
remain constant after that for the rest of the transition. Figure 1.13 shows the evolution
of prices. As investment goods become cheaper, the wage rate, wt, increases, whereas
the price of services, ps,t, and the rental rate of capital, Rt, decrease.
Table 1.5 shows the change in the aggregate and industry compensation shares between
1980 and 2015, comparing the output of the model with NIPA data. The model can
account for 80% of the fall in the aggregate compensation share, three-quarters of the
decline in the non-services compensation share, and half of the increase in the services
compensation share. Figure 1.14 plots the time series for the compensation shares in
services and non-services, comparing the model transition with data from NIPA industry
accounts.
From Equation 1.4 and Equation 1.5 we can see that sectoral labor shares only depend
on the price of services, ps,t, the rental rate of capital, Rt, and the evolution of capital-
augmenting technology in each sector (Bm,t and Bs,t). As shown in Figure 1.13 and
discussed in the previous section, prices take some time to respond. This explains why
the labor share in services is flat at the beginning of the transition and only starts
increasing when the rental rate starts falling in 1990. In this experiment, the magnitude
of the increase in services is lower. The main reason for this is the general equilibrium
response of the price of services: It also decreases during the transition, and dampens
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Table 1.5: Compensation Share: Change from 1980 to 2015 (HHV)
Data HHV
Aggregate -5.4 pp -4.63 pp
Non-Services -13.61 pp -10.12 pp
Services 5.63 pp 2.82 pp
Notes: This table compares the data generated by the model with industry-level NIPA data. Results
are displayed in percentage points (pp) differences. The 1980 calibration that generates this output is
reported in Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3. Figure 1.14 plots the time series for these changes.
Figure 1.14: Compensation Share: Data and Model, 1980-2015 (HHV)
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Notes: This figure compares the data generated by the model with industry-level NIPA data. The left
panel shows the non-services sector, and the right panel shows the services sector. The 1980 calibration
that generates this output is reported in Table 1.1, Table 1.2, and Table 1.3. Table 1.5 shows a direct
comparison of the change in compensation shares from 1980 to 2015, and Figure A.19 plots the aggregate
compensation share.
the increase in the compensation share in the services sector. However, for the non-
services sector, the labor share starts falling immediately. This is the result of both the
exogenous decrease in Bm,t and the initial increase in the rental rate of capital during
the first years. Then, it starts decreasing at a lower rate as the rental rate of capital
starts declining.
In this experiment, the key input that explains the result is the decrease in capital-
augmenting technology in the non-services sector. In the model, capital in the non-
services sector is getting progressively less productive over the transition. The non-
services producer efficiently decides to use more capital to make up for the negative
technical progress. As a result, even if both producers increase their capital-to-labor
ratio, as capital is getting relatively cheaper, the increase in the non-services producer
is much steeper. Similar to the previous experiment, the differences are large enough to
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entail a decrease in the compensation share in the non-services sector and an increase
in the services sector.
1.6.4 Compensation Share in the Long Run
This section considers the model’s long-run predictions for the compensation share. The
relation between the price of investment goods, qt, and the rental rate of capital, Rt,
plays an important role in these predictions. For this reason, I begin by considering the
relation between qt and Rt in a steady-state equilibrium of the model:
qt
Rt
=
β
1− β(1− δ) (1.6)
Equation 1.6 implies that, in equilibrium, the rental rate of capital and the price of
investment goods have a constant relation. As a consequence, Rt and qt must decrease
by the same percentage during the transition from the initial to the new long-run steady-
state equilibrium. Therefore, Rt also decreases by 57% over the transition between the
two equilibria.
Figure 1.15 illustrates the compensation shares in NIPA and those generated by the
model under the two different calibrations over a time horizon of 100 periods. The long-
run implications of these two experiments are very different. Under the assumption that
investment-specific technological progress stops in the 2010s, the model with differences
in substitutability between factors (black line) further predicts that the divergence will
continue for a few more decades. Under the additional assumption that differences in
labor- and capital-augmenting technology will stop across sectors and that capital and
labor are complements, the model predicts a reversion in the trend in the non-services
sector and a slight convergence between industries (green line).
1.7 Robustness
This section examines the robustness of the results of the benchmark model to departures
from the baseline calibration and assumptions.
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Figure 1.15: Compensation Share: Data and Model, Long Run
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Notes: This figure presents the output from the benchmark model in the long run and the compensation
shares from industry-level NIPA data. The left panel shows the evolution of the compensation share in
non-services industries, and the right panel shows the evolution of the compensation share in services
industries. Figure A.20 plots the aggregate compensation share.
1.7.1 Myopic Agent
This section considers the evolution of the compensation shares in the model when the
representative agent does not have perfect foresight. In the benchmark model, in 1980
the representative agent acquires knowledge of the future path for all exogenous variables
(qt, Am,t, Ams,t, ,Bm,t, or Bms,t). To bound the effect between the two extreme cases,
let us consider the opposite perfect foresight—that is, a perfectly myopic agent.
In this version of the model, the agent learns about the contemporaneous change in
the price of investment and the changes in labor- and capital-augmenting technology for
each period from 1980 to 2015, but does not anticipate future paths for these variables.
In response to each surprising change, the agent optimally chooses new consumption
and capital plans.
Figure 1.16 shows the evolution of compensation shares over the transition, under the
assumption that the agent is perfectly myopic. To facilitate the comparison with the
benchmark model, the time series of the perfect foresight case are also represented in the
graph. The figure shows that the evolution of the compensation shares is very similar
under both assumptions, although the model with a myopic agent predicts a slightly
larger increase in the compensation share in the services sector. In conclusion, assuming
a perfectly myopic agent does not affect the qualitative or quantitative findings of the
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Figure 1.16: Myopic Agent
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Notes: The left panels plot the results for the non-services sector and the right panels the results for
the services sector. The graphs compare the output from the benchmark model with the time series
generated by a model in which the representative agent is perfectly myopic.
Figure 1.17: Smooth Transition
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Notes: The left panels plot the results for the non-services sector and the right panels the results for
the services sector. The graphs compare the output from the benchmark model with the time series
generated by a model in which there is a smooth transition for the exogenous variables. The right
arrow on the right of each panel indicates the value of the compensation shares at the final steady-state
equilibrium.
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benchmark model.
1.7.2 Smooth Transition
How would the results change under an alternative assumption about the evolution of
the exogenous variables after 2015? To answer this question, this section considers an
alternative transition in which the relative price of investment goods and labor- and
capital-augmenting technology mantain a constant growth rate equal to the average
growth rate observed during the period 2005-2015. I assume the growth rate of each
trend declines geometrically to reach 0 growth in 2035.
Figure 1.17 shows that the compensation shares implied by this alternative assumption
are almost equal to the results under the benchmark calibration between 1980 and 2015.
The only noticeable changes refer to the long-run predictions of the model.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper discusses a general divergence in the labor share between services and non-
services industries in the United States over recent decades. Several European countries
experience a similar diverging pattern. Why have services industries experienced a
steady increase in the labor share over recent decades, at a time of global decline in the
aggregate labor share? What drives this increase? By exploiting industry-level data,
I show that this phenomenon occurs in most sub-industries within both services and
non-services, and is related to changes in labor intensity across industries.
I then propose a standard quantitative two-sector model that can account for the
observed patterns in the data. The decrease in the price of investment goods affects
the optimal capital-labor mix differently in non-services and services industries. As
a consequence, the labor share increases in services industries and decreases in non-
services industries. I show that this can be rationalized by differences in the degree
of substitutability between capital and labor and differences in technical change across
industries. However the long-run implications of the two calibrations differ. Under the
assumption that investment-specific technological progress stops in the 2010s, the model
with differences in substitutability between factors further predicts that the divergence
will continue. Under the additional assumption that differences in labor- and capital-
augmenting technology will stop across sectors, the model implies a slight convergence
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between sectors.
This paper is a first attempt to understand the different evolution of the labor share
in services and non-services industries over recent decades. I show that one of the
mechanisms already explored in the literature—the decrease in the price of investment
goods—is consistent not only with the aggregate fall but also with the observed sectoral
divergence. In future work, I would like to incorporate other important features in
the model and explore other differences across industries, such as markups, levels of
outsourcing, or skill composition that may be related to the evolution of the sectoral
labor shares.
Chapter 2
Rich Entrepreneurs and Wealth
Inequality
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2.1 Introduction
Top wealth inequality in the United States, as measured by the share of net worth
accruing to individuals in the top percentiles of the wealth distribution, has increased
dramatically since the 1980s. As reported by Saez and Zucman (2016), the share of
wealth accumulated by the richest 0.1% of all households in the United States increased
from 8% in 1980 to almost 22% in 2012.
Why have individuals at the top of the wealth distribution increased their share of
wealth so dramatically? This paper argues that part of the increase in wealth inequality
at the top, is explained by the rise of “superstar firms”, that is, the upsurge of industry
giants, such as Amazon and Google, that have benefited from globalization and techno-
logical change to increasingly dominate the market (Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and
van Reenen (2017b)).
In this paper, we show that these firms are, to a large extent, controlled by a few
entrepreneurs who have experienced the explosive growth of their net worth as a con-
sequence of their firms’ extraordinary performance. For example, Jeff Bezos and Larry
Page own 20% and 7% of Amazon and Google, respectively. Their stakes in these firms
represent roughly 90% of their total net worth, which explains the close link between
the evolution of the market value of these firms and their owner’s wealth. Over the
last decades, the rising market capitalization of Amazon and Google has generated very
large returns to their owners, and consequently has contributed to the increase in wealth
inequality.
To study the joint evolution of the net worth of individuals at the top of the wealth
distribution and the performance of the firms they invest in, we construct a novel owner-
firm matched panel dataset. We combine the official records of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), individual-level data from Forbes (constructed by Civale,
Diez-Catalan, and Salgado (2016)), and firm-level data from Compustat and the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
Using the SEC filings, we identify every individual who has a qualified ownership (i.e.,
she beneficially owns more than 5% of the outstanding shares) of a publicly traded firm
in the United States, or has an important position in the company (e.g., CEO, CFO, or
member of the board). In particular, the SEC filings provide information on the number
of shares held by each of these individuals, allowing us to construct an estimate of the
wealth invested in publicly traded firms. Our raw data set contains more than 26,000
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individuals with information since 1996. In this paper, we match individual-level data
(net worth, age, education, etc.) to firm-level data (employment, sales, stock returns,
industry, etc.) for all the individuals listed in Forbes who have a qualified participation
in a publicly traded firm. We complement this dataset with macro- and sectoral-level
economic indicators.
We focus on Forbes’ ranking of the 400 richest individuals in the United States (F400)
for several reasons. First, it is the only panel data source on the net worth of very wealthy
individuals in the United States. Second, even if they represent a small proportion of
all households in the United States, the F400 own a sizable share of the US total net
worth (around 3% in 2015). Third, the dynamics of the share of wealth held by these
individuals tracks very closely the dynamics of the share held by the top 0.1%. For
example, the share owned by the F400 increased from 1% to around 3% from 1982 to
2015, mirroring the threefold increase in the share accrued by the top 0.1% as reported
by Saez and Zucman (2016).
Using this dataset, we find that individuals at the top of the wealth distribution
control, on average, 23% of the total shares of the firms in which they have qualified
ownership, and the wealth invested in those firms represents a large fraction of their
total net worth. We also find that changes in these firms’s performance have a significant
impact on the evolution of their owner’s wealth. In particular, we find that a 10% increase
in the stock price of the main publicly traded firm in their portfolios is associated with a
2.7% increase in their net worth. Taken at face value, this number might seem small, but
given the large concentration of wealth in the United States, small changes can generate
extremely large swings in these individual’s wealth, and, in turn, on wealth inequality.
The tight link between the evolution of the wealth of the richest individuals and the
firms they own, which we interpret as lack of diversification, motivates us to take a closer
look at these companies. We find that the firms controlled by the richest individuals in
the United States represent a sizable proportion of the US economy in terms of GDP,
employment, and net worth, and their importance has increased substantially during the
last 30 years, mirroring the increase in wealth inequality. For instance, the total sales
of firms controlled by individuals at the top of the wealth distribution represented 3%
of the US GDP in 1980. In 2015, this number rose to 9%. We find a similar increasing
share in employment and market capitalization. We also find that firms controlled
by individuals at the top of the wealth distribution show higher average growth rates
and lower dispersion in terms of sales growth, productivity growth, and stock returns,
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even after controlling for observable characteristics such as size, sector, or firm’s age.
Moreover, these differences seem persistent for long periods along the life cycle of the
firm.
Related Literature
This paper is related to the literature that documents the steady increase in wealth
inequality since the late 1980s. Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus (2016) and
Saez and Zucman (2016) estimate that the share of wealth owned by the 1% wealthiest
households in the United States increased substantially between 1980 and 2013. We
contribute to this literature by studying a panel data set of the richest individuals
in the United States and we link these individuals to their firms. We show that a
large part of the increase in the share of the wealth of individuals at the upper end
of the distribution is accounted for by individuals with large stakes in publicly traded
firms. We also contribute to the literature that studies the causes of wealth inequality.
Several explanations have been posed to account for the extent and increase in wealth
concentration. Kaymak and Poschke (2016) and Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith Jr (2016)
argue that changes in the tax system can go a long way to explain the rise in wealth
inequality. Civale (2016) analyzes whether the decline in the relative price of capital
goods can account for the rise of wealth concentration. Our results shed additional light
on this issue by pointing to the rise of superstar firms as an additional source of the
increase in wealth inequality.
The rising concentration of economic activity under the control of a few very large
firms has been suggested by Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and Van Reenen (2017c) as a
possible explanation for the decline in the labor share. We contribute to the analysis of
superstar firms by linking companies that are at the top of the market value distribution
(large corporations such as Google, Walmart, and Amazon) to their owners, and ask how
the increase in market concentration has contributed to the increase in wealth inequality.
Other papers have used the information from the Forbes list to study wealth inequal-
ity (e.g., Gomez (2016)) and the information contained in the SEC filing (e.g., Dlugosz,
Fahlenbrach, Gompers, and Metrick (2006) and Volkova (2017)). However, these pa-
pers focus on firms ownership structure and how this affects firm performance. We
are not aware of any paper that combines these two data sources to study individual
entrepreneurs and their wealth.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data that we
use and how we combine the SEC filings, the Forbes list, and firm-level information from
Compustat. Section 2.3 studies the relation of the wealth of the richest individuals in the
United States and their firms. Section 2.4 characterizes these firms and compares them
to the rest of the corporate sector. Section 2.5 provides some preliminary conclusions
and describes the next steps for this research project.
2.2 Data
Our analysis is based on a novel data set that combines individual and firm-level data.
Individual-level data are from two sources. The first is the annual list of the 400 richest
individuals and families in the United States published by Forbes. This dataset contains
net worth information, identification of the main firm or activity that provided individ-
uals’ the wealth, and additional demographics such as gender and age. We complement
this data set using other publicly available sources such as Wikipedia, New York Times
obituaries, alumni newsletters from several schools, etc. The data set contains an un-
balanced panel of 1,612 individuals between 1982 and 2015. See Civale, Diez-Catalan,
and Salgado (2016) for additional details on the construction of this dataset.
Ownership information comes from official SEC records. We access these records
through the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR), which
contains information from 1996 to the present. Individuals and institutions with qualified
ownership of publicly traded firms are required by law to file official documentation
stating their share holdings in publicly traded firms. An individual or institution has
qualified ownership of a publicly traded firm if they beneficially own more than 5% of
of outstanding shares.1 We scrape the SEC website and collect all of the records of
every individual who had a qualified ownership in a publicly traded firm in the United
States since 1998. Our raw data set contains the universe of individuals with qualified
ownership, around 26,300, and 100,000 year-individual observations. For the purposes
of this paper, we only process the information for all the publicly traded firms in which
individuals on the Forbes list have qualified ownership. We record the aggregate amount
of shares owned by each individual and the exact date this information was reported.
See Appendix B.1 for additional details.
1The beneficial owner is the individual or entity that enjoys the benefits of owning an asset, regardless
of whose name the title of the property or security is in.
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Observations of Individuals
Total % of the sample
Individuals Observations Individuals Observations
Forbes 1,612 15,831
With CIK 751 8,283 0.47 0.52
With CIK firm 316 2,250 0.20 0.14
No CIK 545 5,298 0.33 0.34
Note: Table 2.1 reports the sample size and the number of individuals associated to a CIK.
We use individuals’ names, residence, and the name of the firm reported by Forbes to
identify each individual’s Central Index Key (CIK). The CIK is a unique number that
identifies an individual (or a firm) in SEC records. This search generates three types of
individuals. The first group has a CIK, so we can easily identify their firms (for instance,
Jeff Bezos has qualified ownership of Amazon, and therefore he has a CIK). Individuals
in the second group are not directly associated to a CIK but to a firm that has a CIK.
Most of these individuals died before 1996, and therefore, do not have electronically
available records. However, since their firms are easily identifiable, we assign them the
CIK of the corresponding firm. The third group considers individuals who neither have
a CIK nor are associated with a listed firm. The wealth of most of these individuals
is invested in privately held companies for which firm-level data are not available and
we discard all these individuals. This leaves us with a sample of 1,067 individuals who
either have a CIK or are associated with a listed firm. Table 2.1 shows the distribution
of observations with and without CIK.
Next, using the SEC’s EDGAR database, we search for each individual with a CIK
and the list of publicly traded firms in which they have a qualified ownership. This
yields a sample of 2,494 firms, which implies an average of 3.32 firms per individual.
Most individuals, however, hold a small number of firms: Around 50% are only linked
to one publicly traded firm and about 75% to at most two firms. Once we have the link
between the individuals and the firms they own, we use the CIK of the firms to look for
firm-level information in Compustat and in the Center for Research in Security Prices
database (CRSP). Because some firms might be traded on a stock exchange not covered
by Compustat or CRSP, or because the latter does not register the CIK, our sample is
reduced to 746 individuals and 2,249 unique firms.
From Compustat we retrieve firm-level information on sales, employment, stock prices,
number of outstanding shares, and other financial variables from 1970 to 2015. The entire
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sample contains 37,420 firms and 521,567 firm-year observations. From this sample, we
drop all firms with invalid sales (missing or negative), invalid employment (missing or
nonpositive), or are incorporated in a country other than the United States. This leave
us with an unbalanced panel of 260,155 firm-year observations and 21,686 unique firms,
which we merge to our individual-firm matched data set. The merged dataset contains
1,933 unique firms that we are able to match with their owners and a total of 34,911
firm-year observations.
Notice that with this process we can only match individuals and firms if these firms are
publicly traded. To gain additional insight into the determinants of wealth accumulation
for a larger number of individuals, we use information on the industrial sector in which
they have their main investments, as reported on the F400 list.
2.3 Wealthy households and their firms
In this section, we examine whether there is any systematic relation between an indi-
vidual’s net worth and the performance of the firms in which they invest their wealth.
Presumably, very rich individuals have access to a large range of financial products that
allow them to isolate the value of their wealth from idiosyncratic fluctuations in the
value of any particular firm. That is, we should little systematic relation between a
firm’s performance and the evolution of the individual’s wealth. Interestingly, this does
not seem to be the case.
As a simple illustration, Figure 2.1 displays the evolution of an individual’s net worth
(dashed blue line) and the value of wealth invested in his primary firm (solid green line).
The left panel shows a striking case, Amazon’s CEO and main owner, Jeff Bezos, whose
wealth comes almost entirely from his holdings in Amazon (which are around 26% of
the total outstanding shares of the company). In the right panel, we report the time
series of the wealth of Boston Scientific’s CEO John Abele. In this case, even if his
holdings in Boston Scientific represent only a portion of his net worth (around 9% of the
firm’s stock during the sample period), it is still true that the evolution of the company’s
performance and Abele’s wealth are highly correlated. Notice that in this case, we are
able to follow John Abele’s wealth invested in Boston Scientific during periods in which
he was not on the F400 list.
Importantly, the subset of individuals with qualified ownership in a publicly traded
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Figure 2.1: Net Worth and Market Value of Main Firm
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Note: Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of net worth for two individuals in our sample. The dashed blue
line is the nominal net worth as reported by the Forbes. The solid green line is the amount of wealth
each individual has invested in their main firm. The main firm is identified by Forbes as the company
or group of companies for which the individual is best known. We calculate the wealth invested in the
main firm as the total number of beneficially owned shares reported by the SEC filings times the closing
share price each month, as reported by CRSP. Between filings, we assume that ownership is constant.
Figure 2.2: Wealth Share of Individuals
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Note: The left panel reports the share of Forbes wealth accounted by for individuals that have qualified
ownership on a publicly trade firm. The right panel shows the share of of total wealth accounted for all
individuals in the Forbes, and the corresponding share of those with and without qualified ownership.
firms account for almost 80% of the total wealth held by the individuals on the Forbes
list as shown in the left panel of figure 2.2. Moreover, all the increase of the wealth
share held by the individuals on the F400 list is explained by the increase of the wealth
holdings of the individuals for which we can identify their firms using the SEC records.
To see this, the right panel of figure 2.2 shows the share of total wealth of individuals on
the F400 list with and without qualified ownership. It is clear that the increase in the
wealth share accounted for individuals at the top of the wealth distribution is explained
by those who has qualified ownership on publicly traded firms.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Ownership
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Note: The left panel of figure shows the distribution of ownership across all the individuals in the sample.
Individual’s ownership is measured as the ratio between the amount of shares beneficially owned by an
individual and the total number of outstanding shares of a firm, as reported by Compustat. The right
panel shows average ownership by year.
Looking at the SEC filings of all individuals in the sample, we find that, during the
sample period, individuals at the top of the wealth distribution own in average 23% of the
total number of shares of the companies in which they invest their wealth as it is shown
in figure 2.3. The left panel shows the distribution of ownership of the richest individuals
in the United States within the set of firms in which they have qualified participation
across all the years in our sample while the right panel displays the evolution of the
average ownership share, which shows an increasing trend since 2000.
To study the relation between firm performance and the change in net worth more
systematically, Table B.1 shows a series of panel regressions of the log-change of real
net worth on different measures of firm performance and a full set of year and individual
fixed effects. In all columns, the dependent variable is the log difference of real net worth
of individual i between periods t and t+ 1 for the years in which individual i is on the
F400 list, while firm-level variables correspond to the firm Forbes reports as the main
source of individual’s i wealth (e.g. Microsoft is the main firm of Bill Gates). In the first
column of table B.1, the independent variable is the log change of the price of firm’s
stocks. The coefficient is positive and highly significant: a value of 0.27 indicates that an
increase of 1% of the price of the stock generates an increase of 0.27% in the net worth
of the individual who owns that firms. Something similar happens if we measure firm’s
performance market value growth or sales growth. We see a similar pattern in columns
(4) to (6), in which the independent variables are average measures of performance within
a 2-digit SIC. In this case we also find a positive and statistically significant coefficient
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Table 2.2: Sectoral- and Firm-level Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable ∆Log level of Real Net Worth
∆ log (Price)i,t 0.209***
(0.0158)
∆ log (Market Val)i,t 0.231***
(0.0170)
∆ log (Sales)i,t 0.304***
(0.0241)
R2 0.154 0.155 0.153
N 11,006 11,006 11,006
Years 1982-2015 1982-2015 1982-2015
Note: Each column of Table 2.2 corresponds to a different OLS-panel regression that consider year and
individual fixed effects. Standard errors, shown in parentheses below the point estimates, are clustered
at the individual level. ∗ ∗ ∗ denotes 1%, ∗∗ denotes 5%, and ∗ denotes 10% significance, respectively.
across all the measures. Columns (7) to (9) perform the same analysis combining firm-
and industry-level measures. Notice that the coefficients do not change much in terms
of their statistical significance but which indicates that firm and sectoral performance
have a distinct impact on the value of individual’s net worth.
Up to now, we have only used data on individuals for whom we have firm-level infor-
mation; this restricts our analysis to use data on publicly traded firms. Now, we want
to show that the value of the wealth of rich individuals is also strongly correlated with
the performance of the sector in which they undertake their entrepreneurial activities.
On the individual side, we consider all individuals who have large stakes in both public
and private equity companies. For comparison with previous results, we use measures
of sectoral performance calculated from Compustat’s firm-level data. Table 2.2 shows
the results of a series of OLS regressions of the log-change of real net worth on several
measures of sectoral performance. The results are quite similar to those found previously
if we focus only on publicly traded firms.
In summary, in this section we have documented two basic facts. First, a large fraction
of the richest rich individuals in the United States have large stakes in few publicly traded
firms. Second, we have shown that the evolution of their net worth is highly correlated
with the performance of their firms, and more broadly, with the performance of the
sectors in which they have their main investments. This motivates a further analysis
of these firms. How important are they for the overall economy? How they differ from
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the rest of the corporate sector? Answering these questions is the objective of the next
section.
2.4 A characterization of firms of the super rich
In this section we characterize the firms of the richest individuals in the United States.
First, we show that these firms represent a sizable share of the economic activity of the
country. Then, we compare them with the rest of the firms in the corporate sector and
demonstrate that these firms are significantly larger than the typical firm in terms of
sales, market value, and employment.
Figure 2.4 shows how important the firms of wealthy individuals are for the overall
economy. In the left panel we plot the sales-to-GDP ratio, employment share, and wealth
share accounted for by the firms of the individuals at the top of the wealth distribution.
Notably the firms of the richest individuals account for a large proportion of the economic
activity in the United States, and this share has increased substantially over the last 30
years. In terms of GDP, their share has more than doubled, from 10 to 25% from 1970
to 2015. In other words, the firms owned by the wealthiest individuals in the United
States represent a quarter of the GDP. The employment share and the share of wealth
accounted for by these firms has also increased substantially in the last 30 years. One
could object that through the years the number of publicly traded firms has increased
over time, and therefore our measures would naturally show an increasing trend as more
large firms become public. To address this concern, in the right panel of figure 2.4 we
repeat the exercise, now considering a semi-balanced sample of firms with at least 10
years of data between 1990 and 2015 and find a similar pattern: The share of sales over
GDP did rise from 8 to 14% between these years.
In this section we characterize the firms of the richest individuals in the United States
and compare them to the rest of the firms in the corporate sector. We start by showing
in Table 2.3, that the firms of the super rich are significantly larger than the average firm
in the corporate sector in terms of sales, market value, and employment. However, the
sectoral composition of both sets of firms is very similar, as reported in Table 2.4. This
suggests that the individuals at the top of the distribution own the best firms across all
sectors, and they are not highly concentrated in a particular economic activity.
To do this, we compare the distributions of the growth rate of sales, employment, stock
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Figure 2.4: Importance of the Firms of the Richest Households
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Note: The left panel of figure 2.4 shows the sales-to-GDP ratio (dotted black line), employment share
(blue triangles), and market value-to-US total net worth green squares) in percentages. In each line, the
numerator is the sum of the corresponding variable for the firms owned by the richest individuals in the
United States. The right panel shows a similar statistic for the subsample of firms that have at least 10
annual sales observations between 1990 and 2015.
returns, and productivity. In the case of sales, employment, and returns, we calculate
the corresponding growth rate as the log change between years t and t − 1, while our
measure of productivity is the log difference between periods t and t − 1 of the ratio
of sales over employment, zit = logSit/Eit − logSit−1/Eit−1, where Sit is the value of
real sales of firm i in period t and Eit is the level of employment in the same period.
Since our focus is on the characteristics of the firms in terms of their owners–that is,
the entrepreneurs who run these firms, we purge our growth and productivity measures
of differences due to observables firm characteristics. In particular, we consider the
residuals of a regression of sales growth on the size of the firm, its age, and its sector,
and we proceed similarly with the rest of our measures.
The upper left panel of Figure 2.5 shows the empirical density of the sales growth
distribution for the sample of firms owned by the super rich (black line) and the rest
of the corporate sector (blue line). From left to right, the bars show the 10th, 50th,
and 90th percentiles of the corresponding distribution. Two important things to notice
are, first, that the distribution of sales growth is much less dispersed for the firms of
the super rich relative to the rest of the firms in the corporate sector. In particular, the
90th-to-10th percentile spread–a measure of dispersion– is 0.70 in the case of the firms
of the super rich, but 0.48 for the rest of the corporate sector. This pattern remains
unchanged across different variables, such as employment growth, stock returns, and
productivity, as shown in the different panels of Figures 2.5 and 2.6, or if we separate
recessionary periods from expansionary periods, as we do in Appendix Figures B.1 and
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Table 2.3: Firm Size Statistics
F400 Firms
Observations Mean STD P10 P50 P90
Log-Sales 32,552 19.54 2.50 16.35 19.66 22.63
Log-Emp 32,552 7.75 2.32 4.63 7.91 10.64
Log-Market Value 32,552 19.63 2.48 16.41 19.68 22.82
Rest of the Corporate Sector
Observations Mean STD P10 P50 P90
Log-Sales 227,603 17.73 2.53 14.64 17.73 20.95
Log-Emp 227,603 6.44 2.23 3.53 6.49 9.27
Log-Market Value 227,603 17.66 2.52 14.46 17.56 21.02
Note: Table 2.3 shows summary statistics for different firm-level outcomes using annual data from 1970
to 2015 for the sample of firms owned by the richest individuals in the United States (upper panel) and
the rest of the firms in the corporate sector (lower panel).
B.2. Second, the median growth rate of each of these variables, after adjusting for
observables, is larger for the firms of the richest individuals relative to the rest of the
firms in the corporate sector. This, by itself, indicates that the firms of individuals at the
top of the wealth distribution enjoy faster growth in sales and employment and larger
annual returns.
As pointed out by Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2015), returns heterogeneity is
not enough to reconcile the fast increase in wealth inequality in the United States:
this heterogeneity in returns must be persistent over time. In other words, one should
observe that the returns or the growth rates of the firms of individuals at the top of the
wealth distribution are higher for several periods. Figure 2.7 shows one way to study
these differences. It presents the age profile of the log-level of sales and the log-level
or the market capitalization for the firms controlled by rich individuals and the rest of
the corporate sector rescaled to its value at age 0. Here age indicates age of the firm’s
founding. Notably, the firms owned by the richest individuals in the United States grow
much faster than other firms in the corporate sector –and these differences do not seems
to disappear, even after 20 years.2
2Importantly, these patterns are not driven by the sample selection induced by the F400 list, as
we include the firms of the richest individuals for all periods in which the firms are publicly traded,
independent of whether the owners are still at the top of the wealth distribution.
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Table 2.4: Distribution of Firms Across Sectors
Number of Firms Distribution in %
No Forbes Forbes Total No Forbes Forbes Total
Chemicals 415 38 453 2.1 1.97 2.09
Computer & Software 3,568 344 3912 18.06 17.8 18.04
Energy 546 34 580 2.76 1.76 2.67
FIRE 980 93 1,073 4.96 4.81 4.95
Health 3,221 308 3,529 16.31 15.93 16.27
Manufacturing 1,889 197 2,086 9.56 10.19 9.62
No Durable Production 2,139 126 2,265 10.83 6.52 10.44
Durable Production 1,197 120 1,317 6.06 6.21 6.07
Wholesale and Retail 2,141 215 2,356 10.84 11.12 10.86
Telecommunication 507 136 643 2.57 7.04 2.97
Utilities 343 26 369 1.74 1.35 1.70
Others 2,807 296 3,103 14.21 15.31 14.31
Note: Table 2.4 shows the distribution of firms in the sample classified in 12 different sector.
Figure 2.5: Distribution of Sales and Employment Growth
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Note: The left panel of Figure 2.5 shows the empirical density of the residuals of a panel regression of
the sales growth of each firm on a measure of size (log-sales), year dummies, and 2-digit SIC dummies.
The sample spans from 1970 to 2015. In the plot, the black line is the density across all firms owned
by the richest individuals in the United States, while the blue line is the density of the rest of the firms
in the corporate sector. From right, the vertical lines are the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of the
corresponding distribution. The right panel shows the corresponding density for employment growth.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the dramatic increase in wealth inequality at the top of the
distribution experienced by the United States since the 1980. We propose and evaluate
the hypothesis that the rise of superstar firms (industry giants that have taken advantage
of globalization and technological change to increasingly dominate the market, such as
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Figure 2.6: Distribution of Returns and Productivity
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Note: The upper left panel of Figure 2.6 shows the empirical density of the residuals of a panel regression
of stock returns and a measure of profitability. See notes in table 2.5 for additional details.
Figure 2.7: Age Profiles
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Note: Figure 2.7 shows the age profile of the log-real sales (left panel) and log real market value (right
panel), separating firms owned by the richest individuals in the United States (blue squares) and the
rest of the corporate sector (black circles). Each line corresponds to the values of an age dummy in a
regression of log-sales (log market), controlling for age and cohort effects (assuming there are no time
effects).
Amazon and Google) have contributed substantially to the increase in wealth inequality.
To this end, we built a novel dataset that combines individual- and firm-level information.
Using this data, we are able to link the firms at the top of the market value distribution
to their owners, who, in turn, are at the top of the net worth distribution in the United
States. We also find that individuals at the top of the wealth distribution invest their
wealth in one or two main firms, which we interpret as a lack of asset diversification.
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Our analysis is mainly descriptive, but provides interesting avenues for future studies.
For instance, incorporating these facts in a general equilibrium model would allow us
to better quantify the importance of technical change and globalization to the rise of
superstar firms, and ultimately, to the increase in wealth inequality. Solving this model
is one aspect of our ongoing research efforts.
Chapter 3
Discretizing a Process with
Non-zero Skewness and High
Kurtosis
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3.1 Introduction
For many economic applications, researchers must specify a stochastic process that gov-
erns the evolution of a key variable. Because the analytical and numerical solutions of
a model depend crucially on this choice, calibrating the process and its discrete approx-
imation demands great care.
Thanks to their tractability, AR(1) processes with Gaussian innovations are a popular
choice for many problems in the literature. Consequently, several methods have been
developed that can discretize an AR(1) process accurately.
However, a growing body of literature, including Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-
Eksten, and Terry (2012) and Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015), shows that
higher order moments display interesting empirical patterns that cannot be reproduced
by a Gaussian AR(1) process. The analysis of these patterns poses a challenge for the
economic practitioner who needs to choose (i) a process that is tractable but flexible
enough to capture these patterns and (ii) a discrete approximation of the process.
In this paper we develop and test a discretization method to calibrate a first-order
Markov process that features non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis in the levels and in
the innovations.
Since our discretization method is based on the method of Tauchen (1986) we will
refer to it as Extended Tauchen (ET). The ET method is different from the method
of Tauchen (1986) in two ways: (i) The innovations to the autoregressive process are
distributed as a mixture of normals. This assumption makes the process flexible enough
to feature the desired level of skewness and kurtosis. (ii) The choice of the state space
is optimal with respect to a set of targeted moments. The latter change entails a sizable
gain in the precision of the approximation.
In order to apply the ET method a practitioner needs to calibrate a first-order au-
toregressive process with normal mixture innovations (NMAR). Therefore we study the
properties of a NMAR and uncover what combinations of skewness and kurtosis it can
feature. We find that a NMAR is flexible enough to match the higher order moments
found in the empirical literature.
Finally, we present an economic application of the Extended Tauchen method within
a standard Aiyagari economy. We find that an increase in the kurtosis of the idiosyn-
cratic shocks decreases the general equilibrium interest rate, while an increase in the left
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skewness of the idiosyncratic shocks increases the equilibrium interest rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 illustrates the connection
between this paper and the existing literature. In Section 3.3 we discuss the calibration
of a NMAR process and we study what combinations of skewness and kurtosis it can
feature. Section 3.4 introduces and tests the Extended Tauchen method. We show
that ET can be used to calibrate a discrete Markov chain that features non-Gaussian
skewness and kurtosis. We then illustrate how accurately the method matches the values
of skewness and kurtosis found in the empirical literature. Finally, Section 3.5 presents an
economic application of the Extended Tauchen method in a standard Aiyagari economy.
3.2 Related Literature
Because of their tractability, autoregressive processes with Gaussian innovations are
widely used to model key economic variables. Aiyagari (1994), Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes (1995) and Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004) use an AR(1) process to model
earning dynamics. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) use it to model the evolution of firm
profits, while Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012) employ it to model the dynamics of
volatility.
To implement these frameworks numerically, several discretization methods exist to
approximate the continuous process with a Markov chain. Tauchen (1986) proposes
calibrating the transition probabilities with the conditional distribution implied by the
AR(1) process. Improving on this method, Tauchen and Hussey (1991) introduce the
idea of placing the state space optimally. In fact, as they argue, the discretization should
accurately approximate the integral equation that characterizes an economic problem.
They show that a quadrature rule describes the optimal placement.
The method of Rouwenhorst (1995) uses a simple construction to obtain a discrete
Markov process that exactly matches the conditional and unconditional first two mo-
ments and the autocorrelation of the process. This calibration offers a dramatic im-
provement, especially in those applications where the persistence of the autoregressive
process is high1.
More closely related to this paper are Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2014) and
1Other related papers compare and establish the properties of these competing methods, often intro-
ducing improvements or extensions as in Kopecky and Suen (2010), Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010),
Adda and Cooper (2003), Flode´n (2008) and Terry and Knotek II (2011).
58
Farmer and Toda (2015). Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2014) propose a calibration
method based on a moment matching procedure, and focuses on the calibration of a mul-
tivariate VAR process. The authors also discuss a potential extension of their method
to calibrate a Markov Chain featuring non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis. However,
they don’t explore the implementation of the method. Farmer and Toda (2015) develop
a method to calibrate a discrete process that matches exactly a chosen set of conditional
moments. However, this method can only be applied to processes whose conditional mo-
ments can be matched exactly, which excludes most applications with non-zero skewness
and high kurtosis.
More recently, a large body of literature has shown that higher order moments display
interesting empirical patterns, which can have major economic implications. In the
literature of earning dynamics, an early example is Geweke and Keane (1997), who fit a
normal mixture model to earnings innovations using Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) data. Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015), using US Social Security
data, report that the innovations to income are characterized by sizable skewness and
high kurtosis. Bonhomme and Robin (2010) use PSID data to document excess kurtosis
of the changes in earnings. Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry
(2012) show that both the distribution of total factor productivity shocks and sales
growth in the United States display negative skewness and excess kurtosis. Bachmann,
Elstner, and Hristov (2015) look at the higher order moments of investment innovations.
They find sizable excess kurtosis but no significant skewness.
In the finance literature, several studies have documented that the returns on financial
assets are leptokurtic—feature fat tails—and, in many cases, feature non-zero skewness.
An example is the early work of Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965). More recent
studies are, among others, Liu and Brorsen (1995) and Chiang and Li (2015).
In light of these findings, our study proposes how to specify a process that features
non-zero skewness and excess kurtosis, and provides a discretization tool to implement
the process numerically.
3.3 NMAR process
Several empirical studies have recently shown that the levels and the differences of some
key economic variables display non-zero skewness and high kurtosis, which are impossible
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to reproduce using an autoregressive process with Gaussian innovations. In this section
we study a simple generalization of an AR(1) process that is flexible enough to feature
such skewness and kurtosis. We focus on a first-order autoregressive process with normal
mixture innovations (NMAR). The findings we discuss in this section are auxiliary to
Section 3.4, since the Extended Tauchen method takes a calibrated NMAR process as
an input.
What motivates our choice is the simplicity and flexibility of this process. In fact we
can easily characterize its moment structure and we can calibrate it to match a wide set
of moments2. We then conclude the section illustrating the calibration of a NMAR by
targeting the income process moments found by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song
(2015).
A NMAR process has the following representation:
yt = ρyt−1 + ηt, (3.1)
where
ηt ∼
{
N(µ1, σ
2
1) with probability p1,
N(µ2, σ
2
2) with probability p2,
and p2 = 1−p1. We denote ∆yt = yt−yt−1 and ∆kyt = yt−yt−k. In Section C.1 we derive
and report the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of η, y and ∆ky. Though these
formulas are useful to calibrate the process and will be used in the following analysis,
we don’t report them in the main body of the paper to keep it readable.
Inspecting Equation C.7 and C.8 we can see that the moments of y and ∆ky are
determined by ρ and by the moments of η. To understand the trade-offs that these
relationships entail, we run a numerical experiment that studies what combinations of
{Var(η),S(η),K(η)} are attainable.
In the first step of this exercise, we calibrate η using the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM). We target combinations of Var(η) ∈ [0.1, 1], S(η) ∈ [−5, 0], and
K(η) ∈ [3, 21]. The first important finding is that the feasibility of a {S(η),K(η)}
combination is independent of Var(η). In light of this fact, we only discuss the feasible
combinations of {S(η),K(η)}. In Figure 3.1 the feasible combinations of {S(η),K(η)} lie
northeast (NE) of the blue line. In other words, there is a calibration of η that delivers
exactly any combination {S(η),K(η)} in the NE region. The combinations southwest
2Geweke and Keane (1997) and Kon (1984) among others have previously used this type of process.
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Figure 3.1: Feasible combinations of {S(η),K(η)}
Notes: In this figure we show what combinations of kurtosis, K(η), and skewness, S(η), are feasible when
calibrating a normal mixture η. The combinations NE of the blue line are exactly attainable. For each
{S(η),K(η)} in the SW region we report the average percentage absolute deviation from {S(η),K(η)}
using a grayscale.
(SW) of the blue line can only be obtained with some error.
To understand the magnitude of this error we compute the average percentage dis-
crepancy of the calibrated skewness and kurtosis from the target and we report it in
Figure 3.1 using a grayscale. For example, the error associated with K(η) = 5 and
S(η) = −3 is 20, meaning that the GMM calibration misses the targets of S and K by
an average of 20%.
To put Figure 3.1 in context, we report the combinations of {S(η),K(η)} found by
Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012) and Bachmann, Elst-
ner, and Hristov (2015), which we label B12 and B15, respectively. Both papers find
combinations that are feasible under a NMAR3.
In the second step of this numerical exercise we map the feasible combinations
{S(η),K(η)} into the feasible combinations of {S(∆y),K(∆y)} and {S(∆5y),K(∆5y)}.
Since the mapping depends on the value of ρ, we repeat the exercise for ρ = 0.8, 0.9, 0.99.
In Figure 3.2 the feasible combinations of skewness and kurtosis lie NE of each frontier.
To put this figure in context, we report the combinations of skewness and kurtosis
3In Figure C.1, we repeat this first step of the numerical exercise to understand what is gained from
using a mixture of three normals rather than two normals.
61
Figure 3.2: Feasible combinations of {S(∆y),K(∆y)} and {S(∆5y),K(∆5y)}
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Notes: In this figure we show what combinations of {S(∆y),K(∆y)} and {S(∆5y),K(∆5y)} are exactly
attainable when calibrating a NMAR process. Within each quadrant we draw the frontier for three
different values of ρ. The feasible combinations lie NE of each frontier.
found by Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012) and Guvenen,
Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015), which we label B12 and G15, respectively. Both
papers find combinations that are feasible under NMAR for the selected values of ρ4.
In the remaining part of this section we consider an application. We calibrate a
NMAR process with GMM, targeting the data moments of Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan,
and Song (2015), which we report in Table 3.1. Six parameters (ρ, p1, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2)
govern NMAR with two normals. The strategy we follow sets ρ = 0.99, p1 = 0.9, and
imposes µ2 = −p1µ1/ (1− p1) to ensure that E (η) = 0. This leaves 3 parameters to
calibrate, (µ1, σ1, σ2). Table 3.2 reports the parametrization of the NMAR that yields
exactly the moments targeted in Table 3.1, and in Table 3.3 we report the complete
moment structure of the calibrated process.
3.4 Extended Tauchen Method
In this section we propose and discuss the Extended Tauchen (ET) method, which
consists of a procedure to discretize a NMAR process. Though the calibration of the
transition probabilities follows the method of Tauchen (1986), ET differs from it in two
important ways. First, we discretize a NMAR instead of a Gaussian AR(1) process,
therefore allowing the discrete process to feature non-zero skewness and high kurtosis.
4As Equation C.8 shows ρ and the moments of η pin down the lag-profile of skewness and kurtosis of
the process. This establishes some trade-offs that we explore in the Online Appendix.
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Table 3.1: Targeted data moments
E(∆y) Var(∆y) S(∆y) K(∆y)
0 0.23 -1.35 17.8
Table 3.2: NMAR calibration
µ1 µ2 σ
2
1 σ
2
2 p1
0.0336 -0.3021 0.0574 1.6749 0.9000
Table 3.3: Moments of the calibrated process
E(ηt) = 0 E(yt) = 0 E(∆yt) = 0
Var(ηt) = 0.23 Var(yt) = 11.50 Var(∆yt) = 0.23
S(ηt) = −1.36 S(yt) = −0.12 S(∆yt) = −1.35
K(ηt) = 17.95 K(yt) = 3.15 K(∆yt) = 17.80
Second, the placement of the state space is chosen optimally with respect to a set of
targeted moments. This allows a sizable gain in the precision of the approximation.
In Section 3.3 we show that a NMAR process is flexible enough to feature non-zero
skewness and high kurtosis. We also illustrate how to calibrate NMAR using income
data moments. In this section, we explore how to discretize a NMAR process specified
as in Equation 3.1 and parametrized by θ = (ρ, p1, µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2).
The objective of the procedure is to calibrate a Markov chain, which we denote by
(z, T ), where z is a state vector and T is a transition matrix. To apply this method a
practitioner needs to choose a set of target moments. This choice needs to be based on
what moments of the process are relevant for the specific application.
Let m (θ) denote a mapping from the continuous process into the set of relevant
moments and mˆ (z, T ) a mapping of (z, T ) into the same set of moments. The prac-
titioner also needs to choose a notion of distance between the targets and the mo-
ments of the Markov chain. We denote this distance by |m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )|, shorthand
for [m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )]′W [m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )], where W is a weighting matrix. Finally, we
will denote by F the cumulative distribution function of η.
The method we propose has the following steps:
1. Choose the number of states n for the discrete process.
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2. Choose a grid of states z = z1, . . . , zn of dimension n.
3. Compute n+ 1 nodes d = d1, . . . , dn+1 as
di =

−∞ if i = 1
∞ if i = n+ 1
(zi−1 + zi) /2 otherwise.
4. For any two states i and j, calibrate the probability of transition between the two
states Tij as
Tij = Pr
{
x′ = zj
∣∣x = zi}
= Pr {dj ≤ ρzi + ηt ≤ dj+1}
= Pr {dj − ρzi ≤ ηt ≤ dj+1 − ρzi}
= F (dj+1 − ρzi)−F (dj − ρzi) .
5. Compute the distance |m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )|.
6. Iterate over steps from (2) to (5),
to find z that minimizes the distance |m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )|.
This method maps a calibrated NMAR into a discrete process and is computationally
manageable and fast. In fact, at each step of the procedure we map the discrete Markov
process into the relevant set of moments using the formulas reported in Section C.2.
The illustration in Section 3.4.1 puts the method to the test with a NMAR process
that displays skewness and kurtosis that are consistent with the values found for the
income process by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015). In this application we
also discuss the choice of the weighting matrix W .
Finally, Gospodinov and Lkhagvasuren (2014) mention that ”non-zero skewness and
excess kurtosis inherently arise in any finite-state approximation”. Since this paper
discusses the calibration of a discrete process featuring non-zero skewness and excess
kurtosis, in the Online Appendix we document this phenomenon for commonly used
discretization methods when applied to a Gaussian AR(1). We find that when a Gaussian
AR(1) is highly persistent, some commonly used methods calibrate a Markov chain whose
innovations and differences feature extremely high kurtosis.
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3.4.1 Discretizing NMAR
In this section we apply ET to a NMAR process calibrated as in Table 3.2, with moments
consistent with the values found by Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015), which
we report in Table 3.1.
We denote the discrete Markov chain by (z, T ), with xt ∼ (z, T ) and et = xt − ρˆxt−1,
where ρˆ is the first-order autocorrelation associated with xt.
In this application of ET we target the moments of the innovations as reported in the
first column of Table 3.3. We target 7 moments: Var(y), Var(η), S(y), S(η), K(y), K(η),
and ρ. Since one can always adjust the state space to match the mean of the process,
we don’t target it.
For this application we choose the weighting matrix so that |m (θ)− mˆ (z, T )| is equal
to the sum of squared percentage deviations of each moment from its target. With this
choice of W the deviations are expressed as a percentage—therefore scale independent—
and each percentage moment condition is weighted equally. Since the choice of W entails
a precision trade-off between the targets it can only be refined in light of a specific
application.
Table 3.4 shows the results from the calibration5. For ease of interpretation, we report
the average percentage absolute deviation of the moments from the targets. We repeat
the exercise for ρ = 0.5, 0.9, 0.95, 0.99, and N = 5, 9, 15, 19.
We observe that the performance improves with the number of states and that a
more persistent process is calibrated less accurately. In Section C.3 we discuss the
computational tractability of this method.
Figure 3.3 concludes this application by plotting the histogram of the stationary dis-
tributions of the innovations and of the levels of the calibrated process for ρ = 0.95 and
for N = 9, 19. This figures illustrate how the innovations and the levels of the process
are leptokurtic and left-skewed.
5We also target the moments found in Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry (2012)
and Bachmann, Elstner, and Hristov (2015). We only report the results for Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan,
and Song (2015) because they are the furthest from the normal case, and therefore the most difficult to
accurately match.
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Figure 3.3: Extended Tauchen, NMAR
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Notes: This figure displays the histogram of the innovations, that is, Eij = zj−ρ(x)zi, and the histogram
of the levels x implied by a Markov chain calibrated with the Extended Tauchen method. In this example,
ρ = 0.95, and we report the results for 9 and 19 states. Notice that in the first and third panel of this
figure, we rescale the y-axis by applying a cubic root transformation in order to make the tails of the
distribution conspicuous.
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Table 3.4: Extended Tauchen, NMAR
ρ N ρˆρ
Var(x)
Var(y)
S(x)
S(y)
K(x)
K(y)
Var(e)
Var(η)
S(e)
S(η)
K(e)
K(η) Av. % Dev.
0.5
5 0.965 1.004 0.999 1.036 1.027 1.004 0.944 2.315
9 1.000 1.002 1.000 1.008 1.002 1.001 0.993 0.267
15 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.003
19 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
0.9
5 1.030 1.097 1.015 0.627 0.813 1.131 1.002 11.924
9 1.013 1.105 1.015 0.835 0.978 1.065 0.862 7.474
15 1.003 1.041 0.999 0.993 1.015 1.023 0.911 2.572
19 1.001 1.029 0.998 0.999 1.018 1.011 0.938 1.789
0.95
5 1.005 0.885 1.025 0.678 0.799 0.920 1.237 14.087
9 1.006 1.073 1.006 0.860 0.946 1.081 1.064 6.076
15 1.003 1.058 1.005 0.928 0.994 1.032 0.946 3.284
19 1.002 1.049 1.002 0.968 1.002 1.020 0.964 2.074
0.99
5 0.969 0.180 1.018 0.688 0.726 0.813 1.265 27.253
9 0.996 0.637 1.004 0.806 0.887 0.719 1.322 18.301
15 1.000 0.931 1.001 0.946 0.971 0.838 1.137 6.470
19 1.000 0.974 1.001 0.986 1.010 0.895 1.063 3.133
Notes: This table shows the performance of the Extended Tauchen method when applied to NMAR.
The results are reported in standard format; the ratio of the moment associated with the approximating
Markov chain over the true value of the moment evaluates the performance of the method. A value of
one indicates that the approximating Markov chain perfectly matches the moment. In the last column
we report the average percentage deviation from the targets. For example, a value of 2.315 indicates
that the calibrated discrete process misses the 7 targets on average by 2.315%. For every specification,
the moments of η remain constant at the levels reported in Table 3.3, whereas the moments of y change
with ρ.
3.5 Aiyagari Calibrated with Extended Tauchen
In this section, we illustrate an application of the ET method in an Aiyagari (1994)
economy. The household problem is
max.
{ct,at+1}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
c1−µt
1− µ
s.t. ct + at+1 = (1 + r)at + wlt
(3.2)
where at+1 ≥ 0. The log-labor endowment follows a NMAR process. We calibrate the
discrete process for labor endowment with 15 states to feature non-zero skewness and
high kurtosis, and we observe the implications of the higher order moments in general
equilibrium.
Following one of the specifications of Aiyagari (1994) we set the variance of the id-
iosyncratic shock to 0.1, the autocorrelation of the process to 0.6, and the relative risk
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Figure 3.4: Level curves of the general equilibrium interest rate
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Notes: For each combination of skewness and kurtosis of the shocks to labor endowment displayed in this
figure, we compute the interest rate at the general equilibrium of an Aiyagari economy. In this figure,
we report the level curves of such interest rate functions. Notice that since we use the ET method to
calibrate the 15-state Markov chain for labor endowment, only the combinations northeast of the blue
line can be calibrated exactly: for more details, see Section 3.3.
aversion coefficient µ = 3. We then solve for the general equilibrium interest rate with
different combinations of skewness and kurtosis for the shock process. Figure 3.4 reports
the results of this experiment, by drawing the level curves of the general equilibrium in-
terest rate.
The figure shows that the interest rate varies considerably with the skewness and
kurtosis of the shocks. More specifically, a higher kurtosis is associated with a lower
interest rate—at the aggregate level, the agents want to save more—whereas a higher
left skewness is associated with a higher interest rate—at the aggregate level, the agents
want to save less. Since higher kurtosis is synonymous with the greater likelihood of tail
events, the result about higher kurtosis is intuitive.
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However the fact that higher left skewness—increased downturn risk—translates into
smaller aggregate saving is somewhat surprising and requires further explanation. To
better understand the results shown in Figure 3.4, we compare the stationary asset
distribution and the stationary shock distribution under 4 calibrations. The benchmark
calibration is characterized by 0 skewness and kurtosis of 3. The other three calibrations
match the skewness, the kurtosis, and both the skewness and the kurtosis reported in
Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015) respectively. In the first panel of Figure 3.5,
we introduce only skewness and we observe that the agents who are close to the borrowing
constraint save more whereas wealthier agents save less. Because the effect on the
upper tail dominates the effect on the left shoulder of the distribution, aggregate saving
decreases and the interest rate increases. By comparing the first and second panel of
Figure 3.6, we can gain some intuition into why wealthier agents save less under a process
with higher left skewness. We observe that matching negative skewness while keeping
the other moments of the distribution constant means that some probability mass must
move above zero. In fact under a process with negative skewness of -1.36 the probability
of a positive shock is 0.57 as opposed to 0.40 under the benchmark case. Since wealthy
agents are not sensitive to left skewness but face a higher probability of receiving a good
shock they save less.
In the second panel of Figure 3.5, we introduce only kurtosis, which results in higher
aggregate saving. In the third panel, we introduce both skewness and kurtosis. Since the
effect of kurtosis dominates the effect of skewness, aggregate saving increases. Because
the two effects tend to cancel each other out, the change in interest rate is only moderate,
even though the change in the asset distributions is sizable.
3.6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a discretization method to calibrate a
Markov chain that features non-zero skewness and high kurtosis. The Extended Tauchen
method calibrates a Markov chain using a procedure that is similar to that of Tauchen
(1986). This method is fast and delivers an accurate calibration. Finally, we illustrate
an economic application of the Extended Tauchen method in an Aiyagari economy. We
find that introducing idiosyncratic shocks with skewness and excess kurtosis affects the
aggregate level of savings and its distribution, therefore changing the general equilibrium
interest rate.
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Figure 3.5: Stationary asset distribution
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Notes: This figure displays the stationary asset distribution in an Aiyagari economy under three different
calibrations of the process for labor endowment. Each distribution—in gray— is represented together
with a benchmark asset distribution that is derived under a Gaussian process. In the benchmark economy,
the equilibrium interest rate is 3.06 and the Gini coefficient equals 0.38. The values of skewness and
kurtosis that we calibrate are taken from Guvenen, Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015).
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Figure 3.6: Stationary distribution of labor endowment
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Notes: This figure displays the stationary distribution of the levels of labor endowments under four
different calibrations. The values of skewness and kurtosis that we calibrate are taken from Guvenen,
Karahan, Ozkan, and Song (2015).
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A.1 Figures and Tables
Figure A.1: Gross Value Added Share, 1980-2015
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Notes: The figure plots the gross value added share for services and the largest non-services industries
from 1980 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data.
Figure A.2: Employment Share, 1980-2015
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Notes: The figure plots the employment share for services and the largest non-services industries from
1980 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data.
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Figure A.3: Compensation Share, 1980-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the aggregate compensation share (black line) for the U.S. nonfarm business
sector from 1980 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Red circles show the compensation share for
services industries. Dashed blue line shows the compensation share for non-services industries.
Figure A.4: Industry Compensation Shares, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the change in the compensation share for some selected industries from 1980 to
2015 using industry-level NIPA data.
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Figure A.5: Change in Compensation Shares, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the change in the compensation share for all sub-industries from 1987 to 2015
using industry-level NIPA data. The numbers next to the blue bars represent the NAICS codes for each
sub-industry.
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A.2 Data
A.2.1 NIPA/BEA
This section describes in greater detail the Gross Domestic Product by Industry Data of
the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produced by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). It explains which sub-industries are included in each major industry,
the exact data used in the analysis, and the construction of the continuous time series
for the sectoral compensation shares between 1950 and 2015.
In NIPA, industries are classified according to the North American Industrial Classifi-
cation System (NAICS). However, data on wages and salaries, total compensation, and
taxes are only available on the basis of NAICS codes from 1998 and 1987, respectively.
Previous data for wages and salaries, total compensation, and taxes are on the basis of
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Given this data limitation, I only use the
10-industry level of detailed data when studying the compensation share before 1987.
In order to group industries in 10 major sectors, I follow a classification of industries
similar to the one used by Autor, Dorn, Katz, Patterson, and van Reenen (2017b).
Industries are grouped as agriculture (SIC: 07-09 and NAICS: 113); mining (SIC: 10-14
and NAICS: 21); construction (SIC: 15-17 and NAICS: 23); manufacturing (SIC: 20-39
and NAICS: 31-33); transportation (SIC: 40-42 and 44-47 and NAICS: 48-49); utilities
(SIC: 49 and NAICS: 22); wholesale trade (SIC: 50-51 and NAICS: 42); retail trade
(SIC: 52-59 and NAICS: 44-45); FIRE (SIC: 60-67 and NAICS: 52-53); and services
(SIC: 48 and 70-89 and NAICS: 51, 54-56, 61-62, 71-72, and 81). Services industries
therefore include information, professional and business services, education, health, arts
and entertainment, accomodation, and food services.
Construction of continuous time series
For 10 years, from 1987 to 1997, gross value added and total compensation are available
under NAICS and SIC codes. To construct consistent series of the compensation share
by industry, I do as follows. First, I compute the ratio of total compensation and gross
value added using SIC codes and NAICS codes at the most disaggregated level between
1987 and 1997. Then, I compute the average deviation between these two series. Finally,
I scale total compensation and gross value added under the SIC series by the discrepancy.
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Figure A.6: The Compensation Share by Industry
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Notes: The figure plots consistent sectorial compensation shares from 1950 to 2015 using industry-level
NIPA data.
This result in a continuous series, which I then use to calculate compensation shares.1
This effectively shifts the earlier values of the overall U.S. aggregate compensation share
in the nonfarm business sector down by about 1.72 percentage points.2 In Figure A.6, I
report the time series for each industry. To construct the series for total employment, I
use directly data on the NAICS basis from 1950 to 2015.
The exact data I use are:
1An alternative strategy is to compute compensation shares by industry using SIC codes from 1950
to 1997 and NAICS codes from 1987 to 2015, then match the 1987 values at the most disaggregated
level and scale SIC values by the discrepancy. This strategy provides similar results. There are some
differences in the levels, especially for FIRE, retail trade, and wholesale trade, but the time series have
a remarkably similar trend between 1987 and 1997.
2This shift is similar in magnitude (1.17 percentage points) to the overall average shift in the aggregate
compensation share when using pre- and post-2013 revision data from NIPA over the 1987-2011 period.
I also compare the gross value added share time series with the value added share time series already
available in NIPA on the NAICS basis from 1950. As is the case for the sectoral compensation shares,
the trends are remarkably similar and there are only minor differences in the levels for services, retail,
and wholesale trade.
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• Historical series under the SIC system: GDPbyInd VA SIC: https://www.bea.
gov/industry/io_histannual.htm. This has information on value added, total
compensation, wages and salaries, and taxes. This series is based on the 1972
and 1987 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) systems. These data are not
consistent with the 2010 comprehensive revision of the annual industry accounts
or 2013 comprehensive revision of the NIPAs.3
• Valued Added / “1947-2016: up to 71 industries.” Data on value added (from
1947 to 2015), and total compensation and taxes (from 1987 to 2015): https:
//www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm
• COMP, TXPIXS, GOS / “1998-2015: up to 65 industries.” Data on wages and
salaries (from 1998 to 2015): https://www.bea.gov/industry/more.htm
• Employment / “1948-1997: up 65 industries” and NIPA Table 6.4D. Data on
full-time and part-time employees (from 1948 to 2015): https://www.bea.gov/
industry/more.htm
For the analysis in Section 1.4, I exclude Real Estate, since it has a very low com-
pensation share due to the value of assets in the sector, which does not reflect the share
of labor in the production function of the sector. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) also
follow this assumption. I also exclude all the sub-industries with a compensation share
higher than 100% in 2000 in Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.9. These extraordinarily high com-
pensation shares are only related to the dot-com bubble and do not reflect the normal
share of labor in the sector’s production. I therefore exclude “514: Data processing,
internet publishing, and other information services,” “523: Securities, commodity con-
tracts, and investments,” and “5415: Computer systems design and related services,”
with compensation shares equal to 179%, 111%, and 103%, respectively.
A.2.2 KLEMS
This section describes the September 2017 release of EU KLEMS Growth and Productiv-
ity Accounts. The dataset covers all European Union (EU-28) countries and the United
States. Consistent data are available from 1995-2015 for most of the countries.4 Most
3Data on wages and salaries, and total compensation consistent with the 2013 comprehensive revision
of the NIPAs is in Tables 6.2B and 6.2C on the BEA website. However, I do not use this data because
it does not exist in a post-revision version of gross value added by industry under the SIC system.
4Data for Denmark are available from 1975, France from 1978, Finland from 1980, Sweden from 1993,
and the United States from 1987.
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of the raw series are taken from the national accounts of all individual countries, and
they are consistent with the official statistics available in Eurostat and NIPA. At the
lowest level of aggregation, data were collected for 34 industries. The industries are
classified according to the ISIC Rev. 4 (NACE Rev. 2) industry classification. I drop
public administration and postal services in order to be as consistent as possible with
the definition of the non-farm business sector used for the United States.
Compensation Share vs. Labor Share in the United States
KLEMS provides an estimate of labor compensation that includes the self-employed.
This is calculated by applying the ratio of hours worked by total persons engaged to hours
worked by employees to total compensation, assuming that the self-employed receive the
same hourly wages as employees. I can therefore compute the evolution of both the labor
share and compensation share in the United States from 1987 to 2015. Figure A.7 plots
these time series and shows that the evolution of the labor share and the compensation
share were remarkably similar during this time. This provides some evidence that the
compensation share is an informative measure of the divergence between services and
non-services industries.
Figure A.7: Compensation vs. Labor Share (United States), 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage points change in the compensation share for services (red-circles
line), and non-services (blue-dash line) industries from 1987 to 2015 using industry-level KLEMS data. It
also plots the labor share for services (red-triangles line), and non-services (blue-diamond line) industries.
All series are normalized to zero in 1987.
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Figure A.8: Divergence of the Compensation Share, 1995-2015
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Notes: The figure on the left shows year fixed effects from a regression of aggregate, services and non-
services compensation share that also include country fixed effects. The regression is weighted by gross
value added measured in U.S. dollars at market exchange rates. The fixed effects are normalized to
equal the average level of the compensation share in 1995. The figure on the right shows the same graph
normalized at zero in 1995.
Divergence of the Compensation Share in Europe
I construct a series for the compensation share in services and non-services industries
between 1995 and 2015. I have data for all countries since 1995 except for Bulgaria,
Croatia, and Poland, which start in 1999, 2000, and 2003, respectively.5 Figure A.8
shows the evolution of the aggregate (solid black line), services (red circles) and non-
services (dashed-blue line) compensation share in KLEMS by plotting year fixed effects
from a least-squares regression of the compensation shares on country and year fixed
effects. Each observation is weighted by gross value added measured in U.S. dollars at
market exchange rates. Fixed effects are normalized such that the compensation share
equals the average level for each statistic in 1995.
During the sample period, the aggregate compensation share is remarkably constant,
at around 59%. This contrasts with the evolution of the compensation share when we
split industries between services and non-services. On the one hand, services’ compensa-
tion share exhibits a positive upward trend, and it increases from 63% in 1995 to about
67% at the end of the sample. On the other hand, non-services’ compensation share
exhibits a steady downward trend, and it decreases from 56% in 1995 to around 52%
in 2015. In the right-hand panel of Figure A.8, we can see that most of the divergence
started around 2000.
5I drop Malta from the sample, which has an implausible evolution of the compensation share over
this period.
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Figure A.9: Divergence of the Compensation Share (EU-28), 1995-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the percentage point change on the difference between the compensation share
in services and non-services industries from 1995 to 2015 for the EU-28 countries.
Figure A.9 plots the percentage-points change in the difference between services’ and
non-services’ industries compensation shares between 1995 and 2015. It shows that
most of the countries in Europe experienced a similar divergence in the evolution of the
compensation share. Nineteen countries experienced a divergence in the compensation
share, compared to eight that did not.
Figure A.10 plots the same statistic for the EU-15 countries and also shows that, con-
sistent with the pooled regression and the evidence for the United States, the divergence
was predominantly the result of a decrease in the compensation share in non-services
industries and an increase in the compensation share in services industries.
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Figure A.10: Divergence of the Compensation Share (EU-15), 1995-2015
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States. The bottom figures shows the percentage point change in the compensation share for non-services
(blue-bar) and services (red-bar) industries from 1995 to 2015.
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A.2.3 BLS
This section describes the Input/Output data for the U.S. economy for the historical
years 1997-2016 produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).6 It is based on the
2012 North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS), the U.S. Department
of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1997, 2002, and 2007 benchmark
input-output tables, and the BEA Annual input-output tables for 1997-2015.
The main advantage when compared with NIPA data is that it is much more disag-
gregated. However, it only spans 1997-2015. I use this data as a robustness check for
some of the statistics I study in the paper. Following the same criteria explained in
Section A.2.1, I exclude the following sub-industries: Real Estate, “514: Data process-
ing, internet publishing, and other information services,” “523: Securities, commodity
contracts, and investments,” and “5415: Computer systems design and related services.”
Figure A.11: Change in Gross Value Added Share, 2000-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the compensation share in 2000 against the change in gross value added share
from 2000 to 2015 using input-output BLS data. The left panel shows the results for non-services sub-
industries. The right panel shows the results for services sub-industries. Each blue-circle (services)
and black-square (non-services) represents a BLS industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s
gross value added share in 2000. The red-dotted line shows the best-fit line, using the 2000 gross value
added share as the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slope coefficient for non-services
and services sub-industries is statistically different at a 5% level of significance.
6Data are available at https://www.bls.gov/emp/ep_data_input_output_matrix.htm.
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Figure A.12: Change in Gross Value Added Share and Compensation Share,
2000-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the change in gross value added share against the change in compensation
share from 2000 to 2015 using input-output BLS data. The left panel shows the results for non-services
sub-industries. The right panel shows the results for services sub-industries. Each blue-circle (services)
and black-square (non-services) represents a BLS industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s
gross value added share in 2000. The red-dotted line shows the best-fit line, using the 2000 gross value
added share as the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slope coefficient for non-services
and services sub-industries is statistically different at a 10% level of significance.
Figure A.13: Change in the Compensation Share, 1987-2015
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Notes: This figure plots the compensation share in 2000 against the change in the compensation share
from 2000 to 2015 using input-output BLS data. The left panel shows the results for non-services
sub-industries. The right panel shows the results for services sub-industries. Each black-square (non-
services) and blue-circle (services) represents a NIPA industry, with its size reflecting the sub-industry’s
gross value added share in 1987. The red-dotted line shows the best-fit line, using the 1987 gross value
added share as the sub-industry weight. The difference between the slope coefficient for no services and
services sub-industries is statistically different at a 5% level of significance.
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A.2.4 The Relative Price of Investment Goods
I use the time series of the relative price of investment goods available on the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis website (FRED time series PIRIC), which are based on the
estimates of DiCecio (2009). One alternative would be to calculate the relative price
of investment goods as the ratio between the price index of non residential investment,
as reported by the BEA (FRED time series A008RD3Q086SBEA), divided by the price
index of non durable consumption (FRED series CUUR0000SAN). Another option would
be to compute this statistic as the ratio between a measure of investment that only
considers equipment and software (FRED time series A010RD3A086NBEA) and the
price index of non durable consumption. Figure A.14 shows the time series of the three
measures normalized to one in 1980. All display a similar declining trend, but differ on
the magnitude of the fall. Relative to 1980, the statistic that only includes equipment
and software decreased by 65%, the one that considers all investment goods fell by 40%,
and the time series that follows DiCecio (2009) fell by 57%. I use the series produced
by DiCecio (2009), which lies in the middle of the other two estimates.
Figure A.14: The Relative Price of Investment Goods, 1980-2015
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Notes: This figure shows the price of investment relative to the price of consumption. The blue-x
line is obtained as the ratio between the price index of non-residential investment and the price index
of non-durable consumption. The green-triangle line is obtained as the ratio between the price index
of equipment and software and the price index of non-durable consumption. The black-square line is
computed by DiCecio (2009), extrapolating the quality-adjusted series of Gordon (1990). All series are
normalized to one in 1980.
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A.3 Long-run Analysis of the Compensation Share for the
United States, 1950-2015
This section studies the evolution of the compensation share within services and non-
services industries in the United States from 1950 to 2015.
There are two reasons the main analysis starts in 1980. First, 1980 is a major turning
point in the sample: It is both the year when the aggregate compensation share starts
its declining trend and the moment when the divergent trend between services and non-
services industries begins. Second, as the sample goes back in time, there is increasing
worry that the composition of the services industries today may not be comparable
to services industries in the 1950s.7 Nevertheless, this section studies the long-rung
evolution of the compensation share, and extends the sample back to 1950. Results are
consistent with the long-run analysis of Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013).
Figure A.15: The Evolution of the Gross Value Added Share, 1950-2015
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Notes: The left figure plots the gross value added share for services (red circles) and non-services
industries (dashed blue line) from 1950 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. The right figure plots
the gross value added share for some selected non-services industries. For comparison, the gross value
added share for services is also plotted.
Figure A.15 and Figure A.16 plot the evolution of the gross value added share and the
employment share from 1950 to 2015. As discussed in the main text, they illustrate well
the transition of the United States from a manufacturing/trade economy to a service
economy.
The black line in Figure A.17 and Figure A.18 plots the aggregate compensation
share from 1950 to 2015. As is well documented, three main periods can be identified.
7Potential reasons are the advances in information technology and the computer age, which have
substantially disrupted services industries over recent decades.
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Figure A.16: The Evolution of the Employment Share, 1950-2015
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Notes: The left figure plots the employment share for services (red-circle line) and non-services industries
(blue-dash line) from 1950 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. The right figure plots the employment
share for some selected non-services industries. For comparison, the employment share for services is
also plotted. Employment refers to all full-time and part-time workers.
First, from 1950 to the early 1980s, the aggregate compensation share was remarkably
constant, without an obvious trend. Second, in the early 1980s, a trend decline started.
Finally, this decline accelerated from 2000. As a result, from the early 1980s to 2015,
the aggregate compensation share decreased by around 6 percentage points.
Figure A.17 and Figure A.18 also plot the industry’s compensation shares since 1950.
Consistent with the work of Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2013), two main episodes can be
identified. First, up to the early 1980s, all industries seem to move together. All of the
sectors exhibited a positive trend at a time when the aggregate measure did not have a
distinct trend. This is explained by a contemporaneous reshuﬄing in the U.S. economy:
Activity moved from high-compensation-share industries, such as manufacturing and
transportation, to relatively low-compensation-share industries, such as services. Since
1980, discussed at length in the main text, a general divergence in the evolution of the
compensation share unfolds.
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Figure A.17: The Evolution of the Compensation Share, 1950-2015
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Notes: The figure on the left plots the evolution of the aggregate compensation share (black line) for the
U.S. nonfarm business sector from 1950 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Red-circles line shows
the compensation share for services industries. Lastly, the blue-dash line shows the same statistic for
all non-services industries together. The figure on the right plots the industry compensation shares for
some selected industries from industry-level NIPA data.
Figure A.18: Change in the Compensation Share, 1950-2015
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Notes: The left figure plots the percentage points change in the aggregate compensation share (black
line) for the U.S. nonfarm business sector from 1950 to 2015 using industry-level NIPA data. Red-circles
line shows the compensation share for services industries. Lastly, the blue-dash line shows the same
statistic for all non-services industries together. The right figure plots the industry compensation shares
for some selected industries from industry-level NIPA data. All series are normalized to zero in 1950.
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A.4 Model Appendix
This appendix describes the computational strategy used to solve the benchmark model,
and includes some additional figures from the model.
A.4.1 Computational Appendix
The solution of the model implies calculating an initial and final steady state, and the
complete transition path of quantities and prices, given the exogenous sequences of qt,
Am,t, As,t, Bm,t, and Bs,t.
Compute the Steady-state Equilibrium
I assume that the economy is in a steady-state equilibrium in t = 0: All the exogenous
variables equal 1 and the representative agent expects this vector of exogenous variables
to remain constant forever. The algorithm to find the steady-state equilibrium is as
follows,
1. Guess a value function, V0.
2. Guess a value for the consumption of non-services goods, Cm,0. Then, given Cm,0,
solve the following system of non linear equations, which pin down the optimal
values for Km,t,Ks, Lm, Ls, and Cs:
∂Ym
∂Km
= ps
∂Ys
∂Ks
∂Ym
∂Lm
= ps
∂Ys
∂Ls
um =
us
ps
Ls + Lm = 1
Ks +Km = K
Ys = Cs
3. The accumulation of capital no longer depends on s, and we can solve for the
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optimal K ′, given the guess for Cm,0. K ′ implies a value for Cm,1.
V (K) =max.
Cm,K′
u(Cs, Cm) + βV (K
′)
s.t. Cm + q(K
′ − (1− δ)K) ≤ Ym
Cm,K
′ ≥ 0
I use value function iteration and search continuously over the capital space using
cubic spline interpolation.
4. Repeat (2)-(3) until Cm,0 = Cm,1.
5. Repeat (2)-(4) until |V0 − V1| < tol.
Compute the Transition
To calculate the transition path of the economy between an initial and final steady state
requires taking a stand of what the representative agent knows about the evolution of the
economy from period 0 to the infinite future. Here I consider two extremes cases. First,
I assume that the representative agent has perfect foresight about all the exogenous
variables of the model. Second, I assume the representative agent is myopic and learns
about the contemporaneous change in the price of investment and changes in labor- and
capital-augmenting technology for each period, and perceives that such variables will
remain fixed forever. I now describe both algorithms in detail.
a) Perfect Foresight
Given a sequence of exogenous variables Θt = {qt, Am,t, As,t, Bm,t, Bs,t}Tt=0 and a fixed
value of the vector after T periods, ΘT = {qT , Am,T , As,T , Bm,T , Bs,T } for all t > T , I
proceed as follows,
1. Take Θt = Θ0 and Θt = ΘT and calculate the corresponding steady-state equilib-
riums saving the equilibrium quantities, prices and value functions, V s0 and V
s
T .
2. Starting in period T − 1, solve for the optimal policy function associated with the
continuation value, V sT and ΘT−1. Record the value function as, V
s
T−1.
3. Go to period T − 2, take V sT−1 and ΘT−2 as given, and solve the policy function
in T − 2 recording the continuation value. Continue until t = 1. This generates a
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path of value functions for each point in the state space.
4. Given the sequence of value functions, and starting with the K0,ss and Θ0, go for-
ward and compute the optimal quantities and prices. I then use these to compute
the compensation shares over the transition.
b) Myopic
The representative household is surprised every period by the change in the exogenous
process Θt and thinks that is going to remain fixed for the infinite future. To solve for
the transition under this assumption I proceed as follows,
1. Solve the initial steady-state equilibrium of the economy with Θt = Θ0.
2. Go to period t = 1 with Θ1 and assume the representative agent thinks that
Θt = Θ1 for all t. Solve the equilibrium and use the policy function for capital to
determine capital in the next period.
3. Go to period t = 2 and start again in [2.], and proceed until the entire transition
path is completed. This generates a new path for quantities and prices that I then
use to compute the compensation shares.
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A.4.2 Figures
Figure A.19: Aggregate Compensation Share: Data and Model, 1980-2015
NIPA
HHV
σm>1, σs<1
-6
-4
-2
0
1980 1990 2000 2010
Notes: This figure compares the aggregate compensation share generated by the model with industry-
level NIPA data.
Figure A.20: Aggregate Compensation Share: Data and Model, Long Run
NIPA
HHV
σm>1, σs<1
-6
-4
-2
0
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
Notes: This figure compares the aggregate compensation share generated by the model with industry-
level NIPA data in the long run.
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B.1 The SEC filings
Companies and individuals are required by law to file a number of different forms with
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The main purpose of these filings is
to make certain information available to investors. Before the 1990s, all this information
was reported on paper. However, since 1996, all domestic public companies and individ-
uals are required to submit their documents in electronic form via the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.1 See Garc´ıa and Norli (2012) for
more details on the information available in EDGAR. Importantly, public access to these
filings is possible via the SEC website.
There are several different types of filings. For this paper, we extract the relevant
information from these two files:
• SC 13D (Acquisition Statement/Active Ownership): Filing required by 5% (or
more) equity owners within 10 days of acquisition event.
• SC 13G (Higher than 5% Acquisition/Passive Ownership): An annual filing that
must be filed by all reporting persons meeting the 5% equity ownership rule within
45 days after the end of each calendar year.
These forms must be filed by any individual who has a beneficial ownership of 5% or
more of a class of stock. According to Rule 13d-3(a) of the Security Exchange Act of
1934, beneficial owner is “any person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract,
understanding, relationship or otherwise, has or shares” voting or investment power.
For the purpose of this project, for each individual on the F400 list, we collect informa-
tion on the aggregate amount of shares beneficially owned by the reporting person and
the exact date this information was reported. Some of these individuals report shared
ownership of stocks (e.g.m spouse, children, or business partners), and therefore there is
no easy mapping between individual ownership of the stocks and the beneficial owner-
ship reported in the document. The F400 list generally attributes the wealth of spouses
and other family members to a principal family member. As we want to compare our
estimates with the F400 list, we assign all of the stocks to the individual in the list if:
• He shares his holdings with his direct family (either spouse or children).
• He reports having full control of the family business (even if that includes brothers,
sisters, or other relatives).
1Available at https://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html
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We do not include shared holdings with business partners or other family members also
present on the F400 list.
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B.2 Additional Results
Figure B.1: The Firms of the Super Rich – Recession periods
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Figure B.2: The Firms of the Super Rich – Non Recession periods
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C.1 Moments of NMAR
Consider a NMAR process with the following representation: yt = ρyt+1 + ηt, where
ηt =
{
η1 ∼ N(µ1, σ21) with probability p1,
η2 ∼ N(µ2, σ22) with probability p2.
and ρ < 1. In order to calculate the moments of this process, we use the following
properties. First, the raw moments of the innovation can be computed as a weighted
sum of the raw moments of each of the normals: E(ηr) = p1E(ηr1) + p2E(ηr2). Second,
to calculate the moments of yt, and ∆kyt, we use some properties of cumulants. (i) The
nth cumulant of a distribution is homogeneous of degree n, which means that Cn(aX) =
anC(X). (ii) Cumulants are additive, so that if X and Y are independent random
variables, then Cn(X + Y ) = Cn(X) + Cn(Y ). (iii) The following relationships hold.
C1(X) = E(X), C2(X) = Var(X),
C3(X) = S(X)Var(X)
3/2, C4(X) = K(X)Var(X)
2 − 3Var(X)2.
(C.1)
Since
yt =
∞∑
h=0
ηt−hρh,
then
∆kyt = yt − yt−k,
=
∞∑
h=0
ηt−hρh −
∞∑
h=0
ηt−k−hρh,
=
k−1∑
h=0
ηt−hρh +
(
1− ρ−k
) ∞∑
h=k
ηt−hρh.
(C.2)
The cumulant i of y is
Ci (yt) = Ci
( ∞∑
h=0
ηt−hρh
)
=
Ci (ηt)
1− ρi . (C.3)
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The cumulant i of the h-th difference of the process is denoted by Ci(∆hyt) and is
obtained as follows:
Ci (∆kyt) = Ci
[
k−1∑
h=0
ηt−hρh +
(
1− ρ−k
) ∞∑
h=k
ηt−hρh
]
,
=
k−1∑
h=0
Ci (ηt) ρ
hi +
(
1− ρ−k
)i [ ∞∑
h=k
ρhiCi (ηt)
]
,
= Ci (ηt)
[
1− ρki + ρki (1− ρ−k)i
1− ρi
]
.
(C.4)
Using the properties described above, we obtain the complete moment structure which
we report on the next page.
E(ηt) = p1µ1 + p2µ2,
E(η2t ) = p1(µ21 + σ21) + p2(µ22 + σ22),
E(η3t ) = p1(µ31 + 3µ1σ21) + p2(µ32 + 3µ2σ22),
E(η4t ) = p1(µ41 + 6µ21σ21 + 3σ41) + p2(µ42 + 6µ22σ22 + 3σ42),
(C.5)
Var(ηt) = E(η2t )− E(ηt)2,
S(ηt) =
E(η3t )− 3E(ηt)Var(ηt)− E(ηt)3
Std(ηt)3
,
K(ηt) =
E(η4t )− 3E(ηt)4 + 6E(η2t )E(ηt)2 − 4E(ηt)E(η3t )
Var(ηt)2
(C.6)
E(yt) =
E(ηt)
1− ρ ,
Var (yt) =
Var (ηt)
1− ρ2 ,
S (yt) = S(ηt)
(1− ρ2)3/2
1− ρ3 ,
K (yt) = 3 +
(1− ρ2)2(K(ηt)− 3)
1− ρ4 ,
(C.7)
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E(∆kyt) = 0,
Var (∆kyt) =
2Var (ηt)
[
ρk − 1]
ρ2 − 1 ,
S (∆kyt) =
3S(ηt)ρ
k
(
ρk − 1)
2
√
2 (ρ3 − 1)
(
ρk−1
ρ2−1
)3/2 ,
K (∆kyt) =
(
ρ2 − 1)2{ (K(ηt)−3)(ρk−1)[(2ρk−1)ρk+1]ρ4−1 + 6[ρk−1]2(ρ2−1)2 }
2 [ρk − 1]2
,
(C.8)
Var(∆kyt) = Var(∆y)
(
ρk − 1)
(ρ− 1) ,
S(∆kyt) = S(∆y)
√
ρ2 − 1ρk−1√
(ρ+ 1)(ρk − 1) ,
K(∆kyt) = K(∆y)
(
ρ2 + 1
) (
ρ2 − 1)2 (ρk − 1)
(2ρ3 + ρ2 + 1) (ρ4 − 1) [ρk − 1]2
× [(2ρk − 1) ρk + 1]
+
(
ρ2 − 1)2 (ρk − 1) ((2ρk − 1) ρk + 1)
2 (ρ4 − 1) (ρk − 1)2
×
{
− 3
(−2ρ3 + ρ2 + 1)
2ρ3 + ρ2 + 1
+
6
(
ρ4 − 1) (ρk − 1)2
(ρ2 − 1)2 (ρk − 1) ((2ρk − 1) ρk + 1) − 3
}
.
(C.9)
C.2 Analytical Moments of a Markov Process
This section describes how we analytically compute the moments of a Markov chain. The
formulas we report are a straightforward application of the definition of these moments,
and we prefer them to simulation-based computation of the moments because they are
faster and more accurate.
Let a Markov chain be defined by an n-dimensional state vector z and a transition
matrix T . We will denote by Π the stationary distribution of T . Let x be a discrete
random process distributed according to (z, T ). We define the differences and residuals
of the process as et = xt − ρ(x)xt−1, where ρ(x) is the autocorrelation coefficient that
characterizes the Markov chain and e is the innovation to the process, ∆xt = xt − xt−1,
where ∆x is the first difference of the process, ∆kxt = xt − xt−k, where ∆kx is the k-th
difference of the process.
Expected value, standard deviation, variance, skewness, and kurtosis are denoted by
E, Std, Var, S, and K, respectively.
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Moments of x
E(x) =
n∑
i=1
Πizi, Var(x) =
n∑
i=1
Πi(zi − E(x))2,
S(x) =
n∑
i=1
Πi(zi − E(x))3
Std(x)3
, K(x) =
n∑
i=1
Πi(zi − E(x))4
Var(x)2
.
(C.10)
Autocorrelation
ρ(x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTij(zi − E(x))(zj − E(x))
Var(x)
. (C.11)
Moments of e
Let E be an n× n matrix, where each element is defined as follows: Ei,j = zj − ρ(x)zi.
Then the moments of e are given by
E(e) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTijEij , Var(e) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTij(Eij − E(e))2,
S(e) =
n∑
i=1
ΠiTij(Eij − E(e))3
Std(e)3
, K(e) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTij(Eij − E(e))4
Var(e)2
.
(C.12)
Moments of ∆x
Let δ be a n × n matrix, where each element is defined as follows: δi,j = zj − zi Then
the moments of ∆x are given by:
E(∆x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTijδij , Var(∆x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTij(δij − E(∆x))2,
S(∆x) =
n∑
i=1
ΠiTij(δij − E(∆x))3
Std(∆x)3
, K(∆x) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
ΠiTij(δij − E(∆x))4
Var(∆x)2
.
(C.13)
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Moments of ∆kx
To calculate the moments of ∆kx, it is sufficient to replace Tij with (T
k)ij in the formulas
for ∆x. Notice that (T k)ij is the element on row i, column j, of a matrix obtained by
multiplying T by itself k times.
C.3 Speed and performance
In order to assess the practical implementability of the ET method we run a global
optimization algorithm as outlined by Guvenen (2017) with 400 restarts. The set up of
the problem is identical to that of Section 3.4.1. In Table C.1 we report, in seconds, the
time necessary to perform the optimization procedure. Furthermore we report using the
same format as in Table 3.4 the average percentage deviation of the moments from their
targets.
To each restart of the optimization procedure corresponds a N -dimensional mini-
mization. For this reason, as the dimension of the state space increases, it becomes
increasingly harder to find the global minimum unless the function being minimized is
well-behaved. To ensure that the solutions found after 400 restarts are indeed global–
or close to the global solutions–we run the same algorithm with 100,000 restarts. In
Table C.1 we report the results of this optimization procedure. We observe that the
solution after 400 restarts is already global or close to the global minimum.
Another remark is in order. In some cases after 400 restarts we attain an average
percentage deviation that is lower than after 100,000 restarts. This can happen because
the optimization procedure minimizes the sum of squared percentage deviations of each
moment from its target, whereas in Table C.1 we report the average percentage deviation
of each moment from its target.
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C.4 Figures
Figure C.1: Feasible combinations of {S(η),K(η)} with a mixture of 2 or 3
normals
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Notes: In this figure, we show what combinations of kurtosis, K(η), and skewness, S(η), are feasible when
calibrating a mixture of two or three normals. The combinations NE of each line are exactly attainable.
This figure shows that using a mixture of three normals expands the set of feasible combinations only
moderately.
